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DEFINITIONS
Platform A platform can be loosely defined as a product, service or
technology which serves as a foundation upon which
complementary products, services or technologies can be built
by external agents (Gawer, 2009; Porch, Timbrell &
Rosemann, 2015).
Platform owner Platform owner is the focal firm who has the primarily
responsible for the development trajectory of the platform
(Tiwana, 2013).
Platform
complementors
The term complementor  is a short version for the developer
of a complementary product or service  that extend the
Gawer & Henderson, 2007).
Mobility-as-a-
Service
In this study, Mobility-as-a-Service refers to a user-centric,
intelligent mobility distribution model in which all mobility
operator and supplied to users through a single digital platform
(Kamargianni & Matyas, 2017).
MaaS operator MaaS operator is the middle player between service providers
and users. MaaS operator leverages data and purchases capacity
from various transport service providers via secure APIs,
bundles it then resells to users via one integrated interface.
Additionally, MaaS operator can suggest the best routes by
combining different transport modes based on their knowledge
of real-
(demand side) (Kamargianni & Matyas, 2017). In this study, a
MaaS operator assumes the role of a platform owner.
Transport or
mobility service
providers
Transport or mobility service providers are one of the core
suppliers to the MaaS platform. They offer transportation and
mobility-related services, such as taxis, car rental, public
transportation, parking, toll operators, etc. They sell their
capacity and provide access to their data to the MaaS operator
via secure APIs (Kamargianni & Matyas, 2017). In this study,
transport service providers assume the role of platform
complementors.
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11 INTRODUCTION
 largest corporations, such as Apple, Microsoft, and Google, have in
common? While they have different products, functions, and structures, they all share one
common feature: the platform-based business model. Powered by information technology
(IT) transformation, the platform businesses provide the online infrastructure that enables
people, organizations, and resources to interact with one another, creating and capturing
significant amounts of value. Evan and Gawer (2016) substantial
contribution to the global economy is due to their ability to improve productivity through
highly efficient matching, asset utilization and innovation acceleration.
The market value of platform businesses worldwide is estimated to exceed $4 trillion
(ibid). We are all familiar with the tale of platform giants, such as Airbnb and Uber, who
have managed to rearrange industry boundaries and roles, redefine value creation
mechanisms and disrupt the entire industries all within less than a decade (Parker, Van
Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). Some industries have already been disrupted by platform
business, such as social media, books, and music, whereas in some other industries it is
just the beginning. Some researchers even compare the power of platforms to transform
the global economy to that of the industrial revolution (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). As
Parker et al. (2016) put it, the platform revolution is here.
In essence, value creation in a platform business is enabled by interactions between
external producers and consumers and thereby the exchange and consumption of goods
and services (Parker et al., 2016). In traditional businesses, the value chain is typically
linear with producers at one end and consumers at the other. However, the platform
business model triggers a shift towards a complex value matrix, in which producers and
consumers jointly create, exchange and consume value in multiple ways (ibid). Platform
businesses turn the locus of activities inside out, relying on an external network of
complementors to innovate and respond to di
bigger scale than ever before (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Van
Alstyne et al., 2016). Additionally, platforms have a distinctive characteristic called
network effects, which essentially means that more users attract even more users, a
dynamic that generates a self-sustained cycle of growth (Evans & Gawer, 2016; Van
2Alstyne et al., 2016).
So perhaps it is no wonder that the number of businesses who have adopted platform
thinking in recent years has increased considerably and across industries (Kenney &
Zysman, 2016). What is worth noting is that platform business is no longer the territory
of tech and born-digital organizations but it also extends to a wide variety of industries,
from healthcare to machinery to education (Accenture, 2016; Evans & Gawer, 2016). Yet,
despite the attention platform business model has received from both firms and scholars,
there are gaps in our knowledge and its dynamics and development direction is still
unclear (Evans & Gawer, 2016; Kenney & Zysman, 2016).
In particular, existing literature on platform business focuses mainly on technology-
driven industries, leaving a potential research area on the application of platform thinking
in industries that have been considered to be more traditional and less digital type. My
research aims to contribute to that gap by examining the new disruptive phenomenon of
the transportation industry using the theoretical lens of platform business. That
phenomenon is the focus of my thesis  Mobility-as-a-Service.
1.1 Mobility-as-a-Service
unprecedented size of almost 10 billion people, of which two-thirds will live in urban
of
over 70% comparing to 2011 (United Nations, World Population Prospects 2017).
Population rise inevitably increases the demand for travel and transport. Additionally,
vehicle ownership is estimated to double by 2030 (Dargay, Gately & Sommer, 2007),
adding pressure to the already-overcapacity urban infrastructure. Put in another way, the
existing urban infrastructure cannot sustain such an increase in the number of vehicles,
congestions, and pollution, yet building new infrastructure is not always feasible (Bouton,
Knupfer, Mihov & Swartz, 2015). This growing pressure together with the public
expectation to reduce transport emissions to tackle climate change necessitates the
emergence of an innovative mobility solution that can offer a more efficient and
sustainable way to deliver and consume transport (König, Eckhardt, Aapaoja, Sochor &
Karlsson, 2016). In this context, the concept of Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) was born
in 2014 (Hietanen, 2014).
3As a newly emerged concept, MaaS is still evolving with new services continuously being
added (Holmberg, Collado, Sarasini, & Williander, 2016). Therefore, there is not one
single universally accepted definition of MaaS (Holmberg et al., 2016; Kamargianni, Li,
Matyas & Schäfer, 2016). König et al. (2016:10) define MaaS as the following:
ort
needs by integrating planning and payment on a one-stop-shop principle
Kamargianni & Matyas (2017) elaborates the term MaaS as an intelligent mobility service
package which integrates seamlessly various transport modes, such as car rental, bus, and
taxi, and is offered to consumers through a single digital platform. Hietanen (2014)
needs by offering mobility services across different modes via one interface. Across
definitions, three common elements that define a MaaS ecosystem emerge: multimodal
mobility package, one single integrated interface, and personalized mobility service.
Specifically, a MaaS system typically includes an intermodal journey planner, a booking
system, easy-payment and real-time information (Kamargianni et al., 2016). Put it more
simply, instead of owning a car, consumers can alternatively buy a mobility package that
includes all kinds of transport modes and is tailored to their personal needs.
1.2 Research objectives
Being able to attract participants determines whether a platform is successful or not
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). To achieve that, the platform owner needs to understand the
motivations of participants and how to stimulate them (Antikhainen & Väätäjä, 2010).
Building on that premise, my study aims to discover how a Mobility-as-a-Service could
attract different actors to join the platform to improve urban transport. The empirical
setting of this study is the MaaS ecosystem in Helsinki. The research problem is
investigated through the following research questions:
Research Question 1: What motivates transport service providers to join a MaaS
ecosystem?
Research Question 2: How could a MaaS operator attract service providers?
The research questions are empirically important because the MaaS concept is novel and
attracts a great amount of attention not only in Finland but also worldwide. However, it
4is still significantly under-researched with little scientific literature available (Holmberg
et al., 2016). Furthermore, because MaaS is in its early phase, the business model is
evolving with loosely defined boundaries, presenting an interesting research area in
which applying platform-thinking might yield promising results.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis has of six chapters. In chapter 2, I review the relevant literature to this study.
In particular, theories related to platform business and motivation are discussed in-depth.
At the end of the chapter, key findings of the literature review are summarized and a
theoretical framework is presented, which serves as a guideline for the empirical part of
my study.
Chapter 3 introduces the research methodology. Specifically, I explain my research
approach as well as how the data is collected and analyzed. The chapter ends with an
evaluation of the research based on common methods in empirical social studies.
Chapter 4 discusses the empirical findings of my thesis. The chapter consists of four sub-
chapters. The first two sub-chapters provides the viewpoints of the interviewees on the
future of mobility and Mobility-as-a-Service concept. The next two sub-chapters provide
a detailed review of the main findings, including factors that encourage and discourage
platform participation.
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis and discussion of the findings. The objective is
to make sense of what the findings mean and to connect them with existing theories. The
analysis allows revision of the theoretical framework introduced in chapter 2.
Finally, chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of key findings and their practical
suggestions. I conclude the thesis by reviewing the limitations of the study and suggesting
potential topics for future researchers.
52 LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of platform business has become increasingly popular in the past years. The
success of tech giants such as Facebook, Amazon, Airbnb and the like has proven the
significant role of platform in value-creation (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2011).
The literature about platform is characterized as a newly developed field with an
exponentially increasing number of studies (Thomas, Autio & Gann, 2014), some of
which can be inconsistent or even contradicting with each other (Porch, Timbrell &
Rosemann, 2015). It means that any attempt to classify different types of platform will be
somewhat incomplete. However, it still offers a potentially relevant lens to understand
and make sense of my research. Therefore, my literature review starts with a summary of
different platform categories which is then used to develop the justification for the
business model of the case company. It is then followed by a review of various
mechanisms that a platform owner uses to run its ecosystem. I will then venture to the
field of psychology to gain a deeper understanding of the motivations of players in an
open innovation ecosystem. As a result, my theoretical framework is built on two domains:
platform and motivation theories.
2.1 Classification system of platform business
Platform can be conceptualized as a type of meta-organization that can evolve and fluidly
extend its boundary from internal to external organizations (Gawer, 2014). There is no
unified definition of what a platform business is, and it can get complicated to try to find
one because each theoretical perspective offers its version of platform definition. To
avoid limiting myself to one specific perspective, I choose to follow the broadest
explanation in which  refers to products, services or technologies that
function as a foundation upon which complementary products, services or technologies
can be built upon (Gawer, 2009; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). Another way to
distinguish a platform business is that its value chain is not linear like that of a traditional
business.
in the literature over the years to reflect the development of the phenomena, moving from
internal product platform to external platform ecosystem (figure 1). At the highest level,
platform can be categorized into firm-internal and firm-external types (ibid). As
6mentioned earlier, it is important to understand that platforms are not static but rather
evolving organizations (Hagiu, 2006; Gawer, 2014). It means that a pla
model can change over time when it moves from startup to mature stage. Furthermore, a
traditional business can also eventually turn to platform business. The complexity of a
platform increases when it moves from internal towards external platform (Thomas et al.,
2014).
Figure 1. A classification system of platform business
The participants of internal platforms are the firm and its sub-units (Gawer, 2014). In
essence, internal platforms comprise common organizational resources, subsystems, and
capabilities based on which product development is built to decrease time and cost to
expand product portfolio. Under firm-internal platforms, there is organizational platform
which focuses on organizational and dynamic capabilities that enable firms to respond
and adapt to external changes (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1998) and product family
(Simpson, 2004; Jiao, Simpson & Siddique, 2007; Boudreau, 2010) which emphasizes
on the technical architecture of the product or service to enable flexible and efficient
product diversification. The most common examples of these internal platforms are from
automotive manufacturing applications, machine tools and electronic devices (Porch et
al., 2015). I will not go deeper into the literature of internal platform because it is not the
business model of the case company, and thus, is out of scope.
At the turn of the century, with the emerging dominant role of technical platforms that
fuel the competition in the personal computer industry, the focus of platforms extends
-external platforms focus on two aspects:
facilitation of complementary products or services developed by external agents, and
interaction between two or more different participant groups, of which at least one side
Internal-oriented
platforms
External-oriented
platforms
Organizational
platforms
Product family
platforms
Supply-chain
platforms
Industry platform
Out of scope Thesis focus
7plays the demand-side and the other plays the supply-side (Porch et al., 2015). There are
two types of firm-external platforms. The first one is supply-chain platform which focuses
on the interdependence between an assembler and its suppliers (Brusoni, 2005). This is
also not within the scope of my thesis. The other type is industry platform (Thomas et al.,
2014; Gawer, 2014), which is a technology-based innovation hub, in which a focal firm
(platform leader) opens its technical interface and invites external agents (complementors)
to develops complementary products or services for the platform (Gawer & Cusumano,
2008; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Thomas et al., 2014). In industry platform, the
platform leader relies on complementary products provided by independent external
agents and thus, relinquishes its full control of the system to allow unintended innovation
and new use case to emerge (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & Henderson, 2007;
Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). Typical case studies of this stream include Intel (Gawer &
Cusumano, 2002) and Wikipedia (Garud, Jain & Tuertscher, 2008). Since industry
platform is the focus of my thesis, it will be reviewed in further details in the following
sub-chapter.
2.1.1 Industry platform
Industry platform can be analyzed from two perspectives: industrial economics and
engineering design. It is necessary to emphasize that there is no clear boundary between
the two perspectives and most platforms demonstrate characteristics of both (Gawer,
2014).
The economic theoretical perspective examines platform as types of markets (two-sided
and multi-sided) that facilitate transactions between different groups of customers
(Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee 2006; Armstrong, 2006). From an
economic viewpoint, platforms create value by connecting and coordinating between two
(or more) customer groups through effective pricing mechanisms (Gawer, 2014). At the
very center of the economics research line lies the concept of network effects, which is
divided into direct and indirect network effects. Indirect network effects indicate that the
benefits to a user on one side of a platform depend on the number of users on the other
side, hence, it is also referred as cross-side network effects (Evans, 2003; Hagiu & Wright,
2013; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Hagiu, 2014). Direct network effects mean that the
benefits to a user on one side of a platform depend on the number of users on that same
side, hence, it is also referred to as same-side network effects (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014).
8Network effects can be positive or negative. When the number of platform participants
increases, positive network effects mean the platform has a higher value to a participant,
whereas negative network effects mean lower value (Tiwana, 2013). Researchers pay
significant attention to network effects because of its crucial role in driving growth and
scalability of a platform (Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Hagiu, 2006). By viewing a platform as
a marketplace, the economic perspective focuses on a specific challenge of bringing
multiple sides on board (Parker et al., 2016).
In contrast, the engineering design perspective views platforms as purposefully designed
modular technological architecture (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2013) to
facilitate innovation. The gist of this perspective is that platforms have modular
architecture comprising of a stable core and variable peripheral components to reduce the
interdependencies. This modular architecture allows autonomous innovation between
modules, which in turn enables easy modification by adding, switching, or removing
features (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Gawer, 2014). In other words, the value of a
platform depends on external agents to develop complementary innovations to extend the
, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). The
platform owners determine the degree of openness of its interface between the core and
the periphery. Boudreau (2010) finds empirical evidence proving that when a firm opens
up and gives access for external parties to its resources, it can increase dramatically the
innovation rate to a degree that is beyond any traditional organization capability (ibid).
In short, the engineering design perspective argues that platforms create value by
facilitating innovation at industry level (Schilling, 2000).
Gawer (2014) points out that while providing insights on competition dynamics between
platforms, the economic perspective offers limited explanations on platform innovation.
Similarly, while the engineering design is extremely useful to understand how platforms
innovate, it does not offer explanations on how platforms compete. In reality, platform
competition and platform innovation interact closely with each other and together they
shape the development of platforms. Therefore, to have a comprehensive understanding
of platform business and how it evolves, we need to combine both perspectives. Table 1
below provides a summary of platform definitions with their representative authors.
The participants of internal platforms are the firms and its sub-units Ga
- Organizational platform Focuses on organizational and dynamic capabilities that enable firms to
respond and adapt to external changes
Te
- Product family platform Focuses on the technical architecture of the product or services to enable
flexible and efficient product diversification
Sim
Sid
Firm-external platforms focus on 2 aspects:
- The faciliation of complementary prorducts/services by external agents
- interaction between two or more participant groups (supply-side and demand-
side)
Po
- Supply-chain platform Focuses on the interdependence between the assembler and its supplier
- Industry platform Focuses on providing a foundation for external players to participate in
and develop complementary products to extend the platform's native
functions
Po
Market intermediary
platform (economic
perspective)
The platform acts as a facilitator to enable, connect and coordinate
transactions between two or more distinct customer groups
Ar
(20
Technology-driven
platform (engineering
design perspective)
The platform acts as a technology-based innovation hub, in which a
focal firm opens its technical interface and invites external agents to
develop complementary products or services for the platform
Ga
Ga
(20
Table 1. Summary of platform definitions
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2.1.2 Multi-sided platforms
The typical example of economic perspective is market intermediary platform, also called
double-sided or multisided platform (MSP). An MSP acts as a facilitator to enable and
coordinate transactions between two or more customer groups, and thus effectively
aggregates supply and demand (Hagiu, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Thomas et al., 2014;
Hagiu & Wright, 2013). Gawer (2014) considers market intermediary platform as a
special case of industry platform
Because MSP is essentially a type of intermediary, it is important to differentiate MSP
from traditional market intermediaries by recognizing along the
continuum between pure MSP and pure reseller by understanding the strategic logic
behind such position. According to Hagiu and Wright (2013), an intermediary firm can
choose to be a pure reseller who purchases and then resells products or services, or a pure
MSP who enables transactions without controlling or owning the offerings (Hagiu &
Yoffie, 2009), or a hybrid of both. In other words
depends on how much control it has over transactions between sellers and buyers.
Figure 2 below illustrates the various categories on industry platform.
Figure 2. Categories of industry platform
While MSP emerges as a popular business model nowadays, mainly thanks to the success
of Internet giants, such as Google, Amazon and eBay, Hagiu and Wright (2013) argue
that MSP is not the answer for every business situation and in some cases, the reseller
Industry platform
Industrial economic
perspective
Engineering design
perspective
Pure market
intermediary
Pure multi-sided
platform
(e.g. market intermediary
platform)
(e.g. technology-driven
platform)
Not a clear boundary
but rather flux
A firm s position along the continuum
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model would yield better performance. To determine, four aspects should be examined:
the potential to achieve scale, consideration of aggregation effects, experience of buyer
and/or seller, and market failures. Specifically, reseller is a better model when there is a
significant advantage in terms of economies of scale. For example, economies of scale
play a more noticeable role with high-demand products than with low-demand/long-tail
products. Secondly, reseller strategy is more suitable to bundle products and services that
are complementary to each other and have a higher value when sold together as a package.
Thirdly, a big retailer is in a better position to offer better buyer or seller experience, e.g.
standardized product information and delivery service. Lastly, reseller is a better model
to ensure reliable information about product quality, guarantee the credibility of sellers,
and avoid asymmetrical power between sellers.
Overall, industry platform is considered the most complex type of platform. As a platform
becomes more open, it generally enjoys an increasingly diverse source of innovation
because more external actors will be attracted to join the ecosystem. However, a higher
number of participants also means a more complex system, both in terms of structure and
behaviors. Additionally, Gawer (2014) also noted that the dynamics between the platform
provider and its complementors, while being collaborative, can also be simultaneously
competitive. When a platform reaches this stage, how a platform owner manages and runs
its ecosystem, without relying on managerial hierarchy or supply-chain authority, plays
an essential role to balance this collaborative/competitive dynamic while ensuring
complementor . The following
sub-chapter will discuss in details different mechanisms used by a platform owner to
control and run its ecosystem.
2.2 Mechanisms to incentivize platform participation
An industry platform is born when a platform owner opens its system and invites external
agents to join in and contribute. A platform is, therefore, a complex system by nature.
With an extended network of agents, a platform is by far one of the most complex systems
beyond any existing traditional business organizations due to the interdependencies
among actors and great variability in behaviors (Adner, 2012). To manage such
complexity, a platform owner deploys two mechanisms: platform architecture to reduce
structural complexity and platform governance to reduce behavior complexity. A review
of these mechanisms helps to understand better what a platform can do to incentivize
12
external agents to participate in and contribute to its ecosystem.
2.2.1 Platform architecture
One cannot fully comprehend what a platform ecosystem means without understanding
at least the basics of platform architecture. The platform architecture has two functions:
partitioning and integrating (Tiwana, 2013) and its goal is to balance between autonomy
and coordination. Partitioning means to break down a complex platform ecosystem into
its sub-systems. These sub-systems should be as independent of one another as possible,
allowing autonomy in design and innovation (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). These sub-
systems should then be integrated with the platform to deliver value to end-users. Such
integration is done through a standardized interface, which allows the components of the
platform interoperate seamlessly with minimal efforts for communication and
coordination.
A platform owner needs to determine the degree of modularity of its architecture.
Modularity refers to the extent to which the platform and its complementary components
can be designed and modified independently from each other (Tiwana, 2013). The
purpose of having a modular design is to minimize the interdependencies among the
actors of the ecosystem so that each actor can evolve and make changes without causing
ripple effects to the rest of the system. It allows rapid innovation and easy modification
by adding, switching, or removing features (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Gawer, 2014).
Modularity thus reduces dramatically the transaction and coordination costs that external
actors bear every time they implement a new change, which translates into more frequent
and faster innovation (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Tiwana, 2013). Therefore, Tiwana (2013)
argues that the architecture of a platform strongly influences the motivation of actors to
participate in and innovate complementary products and services for a platform. Tiwana,
Konsynski, and Bush (2010) also emphasize that the decision  where to position a
platform architecture on a continuum between perfectly monolithic and perfectly modular
 is irreversible and has strategic implications
in the future.
The advantages of modular architecture in platform design comes in three-fold. Firstly, it
allows multiple firms to participate in the production and combine efforts to deliver
values for end-users, rather than having one single integrated organization to do all the
work. Choudary (2015) refers to this as the plug-and-play properties of a platform.
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Secondly,
be readily added through the contributions of external actors in the future, illustrating the
emergent properties of a platform ecosystem (Tiwana, 2013). Lastly, it allows external
actors to focus on their expertise and hone their core competence because system
integration is ensured thanks to compliance with
Modularization uses two mechanisms of decoupling and interface standardization to
balance between secrecy and openness. The essence of decoupling is to decide which
functions remain inside the platform  the core, and which ones are left for external
developers  the periphery (Tiwana, 2013). It is suggested that functions that are highly
reusable, generic, and stable should go into the platform so that all actors of the ecosystem
can enjoy the internal functionality enhancement, whereas unproven and high-variety
functions should be left to external developers to foster competition in finding winning
solutions (ibid  to external developers
through standardized interfaces, which provide pre-defined rules and protocols that
dictate how an external module communicates, interoperates, and exchanges data with
the platform. Putting it another way, all interactions between a platform and its modules
occur through these interfaces. To ensure platform-wide integration, it is required that the
are precisely documented, stable, and versatile (ibid).
To sum it up, a platform modularizes its ecosystem to enable autonomous development
of external developers on a large scale while maintaining low transaction costs. Then it
leverages standardized interfaces to enable system integration between external
components and the platform while keeping coordination costs low. The next logical
question is how to get external developers to comply with a
especially with newly introduced ones. Platform governance, which we will discuss in
the next sub-chapter, plays
design rules.
2.2.2 Platform governance
Platform governance is defined as mechanisms used to facilitate the activities of external
agents ecosystem. Unlike traditional business, platform
owners do not have hierarchical authority to control external agents, rather they rely on
governance mechanisms to orchestrate the behaviors of the platform participants. Similar
to platform architecture, the goal of platform governance is to balance between autonomy
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and coordination to ensure that independent innovation can be successfully integrated to
the platform and deliver values to end-users (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Boudreau, 2010;
Tiwana, 2013).
Tiwana (2013) identifies three dimensions of platform governance: pricing policies,
decision rights, and control mechanisms, which are agreed by many other researchers
(Eisenmann et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2014; Gawer, 2014).
The first dimension, pricing policies, is the focus of many researchers because it is key
to incentivize and encourage external agents to innovate and develop platform
complements (Hagiu, 2006; Tiwana, 2013; Parker et al., 2016). Additionally, pricing
policies directly influence the market competition which reflects through multi-home,
which means the extent to which a user can participate in several competing platforms
simultaneously, and lock-in effect, which occurs when switching costs are significant
enough to discourage users to change from one platform to another (Rochet & Tirole,
2003; Porch et al., 2015).
Two main decisions regarding pricing policies are as follows. Firstly, a platform owner
must decide whether they should charge money from both sides of a platform, or they
should subsidize one side and make money with the other side. Rochet and Tirole (2003)
suggest that the subsidized side should be the one whose number of participants has
significant value to the other side. Secondly, platform owners must decide how to divvy
the proceeds between external agents and the platform owner. The choice can be either a
fixed scale, which is a percentage predetermined by platform owners, or a moving scale,
which changes based on volume. In the context of software system, Tiwana (2013)
suggests that the platform owner should decide to charge an access-based fee or usage-
based fee, whereas app developers decide on the pricing scheme for their apps, such as
one-time payment, subscription payment, or usage-based payment. Pricing decisions
el.
Studies have proven that pricing alone is not sufficient to regulate platform ecosystem
(Gaware & Cusumano, 2002). Instead, platform owners rely on nuanced combinations of
various non-price levers, including legal, cooperative, technological, informational,
administrative, and other instruments, to encourage and regulate interactions among
external agents. While Boudreau and Hagiu (2008) refer to these instruments as boundary
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resources, Tiwana (2013) call them decision right and control mechanisms, two out of
three dimensions of platform governance.
Decision right essentially means who makes what decision and it determines the extent
of autonomy of a platform. It can be anywhere along the continuum between
centralization, meaning the platform owner has the authority to make decisions, and
decentralization, meaning the external agents have the authority to make decisions. There
are two broad groups of decisions to be made: strategic and implementation. While
strategic decisions determine the development direction of the platform, implementation
decisions decide on platform details, such as features, functionality, design, and user
interface. It is emphasized that decision right allocation should reflect the architecture of
a platform (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), meaning that a platform with modular architecture
should also have a modular division of decision rights between the platform owner and
external agents, whereas a platform with monolithic architecture should have centralized
decision-making process.  Tiwana (2013) notes that for certain types of decisions, both
platform owners and external agents should provide inputs
strengths and core knowledge.
Finally, control mechanisms, are tools used to ensure alignment between independent
s best interests. Control mechanisms
implement and enforce by encouraging desirable behaviors and
punishing undesirable ones. Tiwana (2013) suggested that a platform  control portfolio
is a combination of four independent mechanisms: gatekeeping, process, metrics, and
relational. While the first three mechanisms  gatekeeping, process, and metrics  are a
formal form of control, the last one  relational  is informal control. Firstly, gatekeeping
control refers to pre-defined criteria imposed by the platform owner to determine who
can participate in its ecosystem. Secondly, process control refers to the extent to which
the platform owner rewards external agents who comply with
and punishes those who do not comply. Thirdly, metrics refer to the degree to which the
platform owner rewards or punishes external agents based on their performance. However,
metrics-based control is rarely used in platform context because market competition is a
powerful mechanism to determine winners and losers. Lastly, relational control refers to
norms, values, and culture set by a platform owner to influence behaviors of external
agents and align their work with the goals of the platform owner. Relational control is
hardly sufficient by itself because it takes time to develop and requires a stable pool of
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Levers that in
control of focal firm
Pricing
Non-
pricing
Architecture
Governance
Modularity
Standardized
interface
Decision
rights
Control
mechanism
external agents. However, it is an inexpensive mechanism that complements nicely the
other formal control forms. Choudary (2015) adds the fifth type  interaction control
which is used to regulate the quantity and quality of interactions among platform
participants, interactions that determine how strong and sustainable network effects a
platform can generate.
Overall, levers used by a platform owner to ensure the success of its ecosystem can be
divided into pricing and non-pricing ones. The reason for this categorization is due to a
significant number of studies on the effects of pricing on platform participation. Non-
pricing mechanisms can be further divided into architecture, which includes modularity
and standardized interface, and governance, which includes decision rights and control
mechanisms (figure 3). Table 2 provides a summary of these levers and their
representative authors.
Figure 3. Levers to incentivize platform participation
Architecture Modularity - Increase autonomy
- Reduce transaction costs
Parker &
al. (2010)
Cusuman
Standardized
interfaces
- Reduce integration costs Tiwana et
Gawer &
Governance Decision right Decision rights can place anywhere on the continuum
between centralization and decentralization. There are
two types of decisions: strategic and implementation
Tiwana et
Parker et
Control
mechanism
Gatekeeping Gatekeeping control are pre-defined criteria to determine
who and what can participate to a platform ecosystem
Tiwana et
Hagiu (20
Process control Process control is to ensure compliance with platform's
rules
Tiwana et
Parker et
Metric-based
control
Metric-based control is to measure the outcomes, but
rarely used in platform context. Market competition is a
more powerful alternative
Tiwana et
Parker et
Relational
control
Relational conrol are norms, values and cultures that
infuence behaviors of external agents
Tiwana et
Parker et
Interaction
controls
Interaction controls regulate the quality and quantity of
interactions happening on a platform which determine
the strength of network effect
Hagiu (20
Pricing
policies
Pricing is the key incentive to encourage external agents
to participate to a platform ecosystem
Tiwana et
(2006), T
Parker et
Table 2. Summary of levers used to incentivize platform participation
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2.3 Motivation for platform participation
A platform depends on its external complementors to generate value (Eisenmann et al., 2006,
Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). Therefore, it is a consensus among researchers that motivating
external players to participate in and contribute to a platform is crucial to its success (Tiwana,
2013; Koch & Kerschbaum, 2014). However, few studies focus specifically on what motivates
players to join a platform and especially what a platform owner can do to influence such
motivations (Battistella & Nonino, 2012).
Ryan and Deci (2000) define a motivated person as someone who is energized to work to
achieve a goal. My objective in this section is not to perform a meta-analysis of the literature
on motivation theories. Rather the goal is to identify frameworks that can potentially apply to
platform business context. My reviews particularly focus on studies that explain the
motivations of independent participants who can choose, control, and manage their actions.
The following section summarizes key findings in the motivation literature in both platform
business and open innovation context.
2.3.1 Motivation in platform business literature
Studies that look into motivations of external complementors in platform business context often
emphasize economic-driven motivations. In his study on technological platforms, Tiwana
(2013) states that app developers join a platform due to two main reasons: the advantage of
scale and market access. App developers achieve economies of scale because they can leverage
a base of common functionalities provided by the platform owner. As a result, they can focus
on building unique features that differentiate them in the market. Additionally, a platform
provides access to an existing sizable market that would have been otherwise inaccessible
and/or too costly for small developers to acquire on their own (Van Alstyne et al, 2016). In
other words, the motivations to join a platform is increasing demand and reduced search and
transaction costs (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014).
In contrast, in their study on motivations of third-party developers in the context of the
smartphone operating system (OS) ecosystem, Koch and Kerschbaum (2014) have found that
there is a sizable group of developers who are intrinsically driven by factors such as fun and
intellectual stimulation. Developers also attach more importance to improving skills and
developing unavailable solutions than to gaining financial rewards. Boudreau and Jeppesen
(2015) confirm that even without sales incentives, external complementors still contribute to
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platform development because they have multiple sources of motivations, most of which are
not related to platform scale and growth except for signaling and reputational motivations.
Koch and Kerschbaum (2014) also show that comparing to intrinsically motivated developers,
extrinsically motivated ones consider the market size to be significant because it indicates
potential financial gains. Furthermore, they prefer platforms with tight integration due to easier
targeting and less resource expenditure. Additionally, empirical evidence proves that the
process of using a toolkit to build solutions gives personal enjoyment and pride to developers.
Therefore, developers perceive the quality of toolkit, such as software development kit (SDK)
provided by the platform owner, as an important factor in choosing which platform ecosystem
to join.
Overall, the platform literature points out that external developers
are driven scale advantage, market access, and toolkit quality.
2.3.2 Motivation in Open Source Software literature
Since the literature on platform business offers limited insights into what motivates external
players to join a platform, I extended my review to the literature on open innovation. The field
of open source software (OSS) has been studied extensively to identify a wide range of
motivations why external innovators engage with open source projects (Belezon &
Schankermann, 2008). The main difference between OSS and platform business is that most
external developers in OSS volunteer their time and efforts. Understanding this willingness to
work for free has been the key focus of many OSS research (Battistella & Nonino, 2012).
While OSS does not share the same characteristics with platform business, both OSS and
platforms enable open and collection innovation among multiple stakeholders (Adner &
Kapoor, 2010), who are external parties and cannot be managed by traditional employment
contracts or organizational hierarchy (Roberts, Hann & Slaughter, 2006). Additionally, even
though OSS projects do not present clear profit incentives like platform business, results from
the empirical study of Koch and Kerschbaum (2014) show that there are multiple sources of
motivations besides financial gains. Therefore, I would argue that the rich insights from OSS
motivations in platform business. The degree of appropriability will be reviewed through the
empirical results of my study.
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a. The classic Self-Determination framework
While there is no consensus among OSS scholars as to which motivation plays the key role,
past research has proven again and again that the motivations of external developers to
participate in open innovation are incredibly heterogeneous (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009). In
contrast to the belief that extrinsic motivation drives contribution (Lerner & Tirole, 2002),
empirical studies have found evidence proving that potential profit is not the only reason to
participate in OSS (Lakhani & Wolf, 2003; Roberts et al., 2006). Developers can be motivated
by either self-interest reasons, for example, seeking career advancement (Lerner & Tirole, 2002;
Lakhani & Wolf, 2003) or they can be appealed by the ideology of OSS community and feel
conformed to reciprocate to the community that values knowledge sharing (Hertel, Niedner, &
Herrmann, 2003; Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003). Other motivations often quoted in literature
review include learning and skill improvement (Benbya & Belbaly, 2010), enjoyment (Lakhani
& Wolf, 2003), personal need for software solutions (Roberts et al., 2006), a sense of belonging
to the community (Lakhani & Wolf, 2003) and reputation (Roberts et al., 2006; Boudreau &
Lakhani, 2009).
To categorize the variety of motivations mentioned above, many researchers have relied on the
classic self-determination theory (SDT) with its extrinsic/intrinsic dichotomy because it is by
far the most frequently used framework (von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth & Wallin, 2012; Koch
& Kerschbaum, 2014). Deci and Ryan (1985) distinguish intrinsic motivation as the drive to
do something in the absence of external rewards because the reward is in the activity itself. In
contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity for its instrumental value to gain a
separate outcome (Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Based on the basic distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic, many scholars attempt to further
divide the motivations into sub-categories. For instance, Lakhani and Wolf (2003) report that
intrinsic motivation can be sub-divided into 1) enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation in the
form of a sense of creativity or intellectual stimulation, and 2) obligation/community-based
intrinsic motivation. Similarly, extrinsic motivations can be divided into 1) immediate payoffs
in the form of financial reward and personal use-value, and 2) delayed payoffs which include
career advancement and skill development.
Similarly, Battistella and Nonino (2012) categorize intrinsic motivations into two dimensions:
1) individual-driven motivation such as entrepreneurial mindset (Tapscott & Williams, 2006)
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and 2) social-driven motivation such as social responsibility (Benbya & Belbaly, 2010).
Battistella and Nonino (2012) then divide extrinsic motivations into 3 dimensions: 1)
economic motivation in the form of monetary rewards, free products and free services (Tapscott
& Williams, 2006); 2) professional motivation such as reputation and career opportunities
(Roberts et al., 2006); and 3) social motivation which includes a sense of individual
accountability (Benbya & Belbaly, 2010). Based on the above-mentioned categories, one can
argue that the two motivations identified by Tiwana (2013), scale advantage, and market access,
can be considered as extrinsic motivation and specifically, economic type of extrinsic
motivation.
Extending the classic SDT framework, Roberts et al. (2006) propose a third category called
internalized extrinsic motivation to refer to motivations that are by definition extrinsic but are
self-regulated rather than being imposed by external forces, for example, reputation and
learning (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; von Krogh et al., 2012). After reviewing 40 different
studies on individual motivation to engage with OSS development, Von Krogh et al. (2012)
propose 10 motivational groups under the 3 main categories. Intrinsic motivations include
ideology, altruism, kinship, and fun. Internalized extrinsic motivations include reputation,
reciprocity, learning, and own-use. Extrinsic motivations include career and pay.
b. Alternative frameworks
Some scholars propose alternative frameworks. However, they tend to be somewhat related to
ccording to Bonaccorsi
and Rossi (2006), motivations can be categorized into three groups: 1) economic motivation
such as monetary rewards (Hertel et al., 2003) and competence signal to potential employers
(Lerner & Tirole, 2002); 2) social motivation such as gift culture of OSS community and 3)
technological motivation such as learning opportunity to improve programming skills (Lakhani
& von Hippel, 2003). Economic motivation is closely related to extrinsic motivation, whereas
social motivation generally matches to intrinsic motivation.
Unlike other scholars, Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006) also provide insights into the motivations
of firms to contribute to OSS. Because the goals of individuals and firms in participating in
OSS differ, their incentives only overlap partly. In particular, while social motivations are the
typical reasons for individual developers to engage with OSS development, economic and
technological motivations play much
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Potential profit is the main reason that drives firm
indirect revenue by selling related products and lower innovation costs by taking advantage of
R&D spillover (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006). Firms also emphasize the importance of receiving
feedback and contribution from the OS community, based on which they test and improve
product quality, which in turn lower their innovation costs (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). In contrast,
firms only share code and knowledge to comply with the norms of the OSS community and to
sustain the trust and cooperation of individual developers.
Attempts to go beyond self-determination theory can be found in Benbya and Belbaly (2010).
They argue that the wide range of motivations identified by researchers can generally be
explained by two theories. The first one is a traditional economic theory that explains self-
interested behavior when developers pursue outcomes that are beneficial for their future, such
as skill improvement and job opportunities. The second one is social movement theory related
to gift economies to explain selfless behavior when developers contribute to the greater good
of the communities, such as reciprocity and ideology. Benbya and Belbaly (2010) believe that
the SDT framework alone is insufficient to explain the mixed findings of motivations in OSS
development. For example, Lakhani and Wolf (2003) have proved that intrinsic motivations in
the form of enjoyment and fun are the main driver of participation, whereas Roberts et al. (2006)
have found no evidence that could prove the significant influence of intrinsic motivations on
the contribution of developers. Therefore, Benbya and Belbaly (2010) propose a multi-
theoretical framework which includes three theories: goal-orientation, expectancy, and social
exchange. Based on that framework, their study reveals that the setting of open innovation
projects enables an overlap among economic, social, and psychological motives. In particular,
learning goals in terms of skill and competence improvement, professional expectations in
terms of career advancement, reciprocity, and ideology are the primary drivers of developers
to engage with OSS projects.
After reviewing various studies, I conclude that while each scholar has his framework with
different category names, there is quite a significant overlap among them in terms of individual
motivation. Table 3 presents a short description of each motivation types together with their
representative authors, while Figure 4 demonstrates my synthesizing version of findings from
motivation research.
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Figure 4. Motivation types (adapted from Battistella & Nonino, 2012)
Intrinsic
motivations
Extrinsic
motivations
Individual-driven
motivations
Social-driven
motivations
Economic
Professional
Social
Entrepreneurial mindset
Express individual creativity
Sense of membership
Enjoyment, fun & entertainment
Sense of efficacy
Sense of cooperation
Social responsibility
Monetary reward
Free products/services
Learning
Reputation
Reciprocity
Recognition
Individual accountability
Social capital
Table 3. Summary of motivation types
Scale advantage External agents can leverage the
foundation of common functionalities
provided by platform owners to build
their own complementary products and
services
Tiwana
Market access External agents can access existing
markets that would have been
inaccessible otherwise, which in return
reduces search and transaction costs for
external agents
Tiwana
Entrepreneurial mindset Tapscot
Battistel
Opportunity to express individual
creativity
Ryan &
Nonino
Sense of membership Lakhan
Nonino
Enjoyment, fun and entertainment Lakhan
Nonino
Sense of efficacy Bandur
(2012)
Sense of cooperation Antikai
Nonino
Social responsibility Benbya
& Noni
Monetary rewards Antikai
Nonino
Free products (hardware or software) Tapscot
Battistel
Free services Tapscot
(2013),
Learning Benbya
& Noni
Reputation Battistel
Reciprocity Benbya
& Noni
Recognition Benbya
& Noni
Individual accountability Antikai
Belbaly
(2012)
Social captial  Battiste
Table 3 (cont.). Summary of motivation types
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2.3.3 Drivers that facilitate motivation
While it is interesting to know different types of motivation, I would argue that it is even more
important to identify social and environmental drivers that facilitate and undermine motivation.
Researchers agree that intrinsic motivations drive better performance (Ryan & Grolnick, 1986).
The question is how to motivate participants when the activities that are not intrinsically
interesting. This question is particularly relevant for a business context, as Boudreau & Lakhani
(2009) point out, extrinsic motivations are more dominant in competitive markets while
intrinsic motivations are more central in collaborative communities.
Deci and Ryan (1985) answer the above question by arguing that instead of perceiving
motivation as an intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy, it would be better to think of it as a continuum.
There are two reasons why. The first reason is that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are not
mutually exclusive. Studies have shown that the presence of extrinsic motivations does not
affect negatively intrinsic ones (Lakhani & Wolf, 2003). Additionally, in the case of Open
Source Software development, researchers agree that there is no single dominant motivation
that can explain why external developers contribute. Instead, they are motivated by a
combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors (Roberts et al., 2006). The second reason is that
there are various degrees of extrinsic motivation. The continuum ranges from reluctance to
passive submission, to active commitment. This process is called internalization and
 (Ryan & Deci,
2000). Higher internalization degrees drive greater perseverance, better engagement, and
ultimately improved performance. Ryan and Deci (2000) conclude that four key drivers are
particularly relevant to the process of internalizing motivation: expected tangible rewards,
sense of autonomy, sense of competence, and relatedness.
Firstly, every type of tangible reward increases extrinsic motivation, however, it undermines
intrinsic one. Researchers posit that incentives shift the focus from internal to external, and
thus extrinsic motivations replace intrinsic ones (Roberts et al., 2006). Indeed, several studies
have proven that in the presence of money, award, and prizes, or threats and punishments,
subjects show fewer characteristics of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971; Harackiewicz, 1979).
Secondly, a sense of competence (self-efficacy) positively impacts both intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation, and lead to greater engagement and better performance. In Cognitive Evaluation
Theory, Deci and Ryan (1985) argue that rewards, constructive feedback, and communications
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Extrinsic
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Sense of
competence
Relatedness
Individual-driven
motivations
Social-driven
motivations
Economic
Professional
Social
can enhance internalizing motivation because they satisfy the fundamental psychological need
to feel capable and effective (Deci, 1971).
are undermined, intrinsic motivatio
competence are boosted, intrinsic motivation increases (Ryan, 1982). A simple example is that
students, who understand the subject and have relevant skills, are more likely to internalize a
goal.
Besides a sense of competence, a sense of autonomy (self-determined actions) is required to
enhance intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Ryan, 1982). A sense of autonomy refers to a
feeling when people have a chance for self-direction and decide themselves to do something.
Experiments in classroom learning have proven that in an autonomy-supportive environment,
students are more curious, are more ready for challenging tasks, and overall perform better
(Ryan & Grolnick, 1986). Furthermore, researchers also suggest that both needs for
competence and autonomy should be fulfilled to enhance motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Lastly, a sense of relatedness facilitates extrinsic motivation but there is no mentioned effect
on intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The feeling when individuals feel connected to a
group or belong to a peer group or a society provides the foundation for enabling internalized
motivations.
These relationships are illustrated in figure 5 below.
Figure 5. Drivers that facilitate or undermine motivations
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2.4 Theoretical framework
My thesis objective is to understand the factors that a platform owner can leverage to encourage
different transport service providers to participate in and contribute to a mobility-as-a-service
ecosystem. In this section, the key findings of the literature review are presented, based on
which a theoretical framework is developed to further analyze my empirical results.
The key challenge of any platform, especially a newly launched one, is to attract participants
simultaneously because one side of the platform will not join without the presence of the other
side. Researchers refer to this challenge as the chick-and-egg problem (Parker et al, 2016).
Platform literature has focused on mechanisms that the platform owner can deploy to attract
participants (Tiwana, 2013). Main levers are pricing mechanisms, architecture decisions of the
platform as well as governance mechanisms which include decision rights and control. This is
the first part of my theoretical framework, demonstrated by the blue boxes in figure 6 below.
The second part of my theoretical framework consists of different types of motivations which
are based on the Self-Determination Theory from Deci and Ryan (1985) and the drivers that
facilitate or undermine them (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The extended version of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation is provided by Battistella and Nonino (2012) based on their review of
recent literature on motivations in the context of open and collective innovation.
In essence, if motivations are defined as the underlying reasons why someone does something,
then motivational drivers are
motivational drivers are the designs of the platform (architecture) and managerial mechanisms
used to control the platform (governance) (Battistella & Nonino, 2012). While exploring
different platform architecture and governance mechanisms, researchers mention how they can
potentially influence external agents
(Tiwana, 2013). However, it lacks an explicit connection between the two domains of platform
and motivation theories. Therefore, answers to the question ow can a platform be designed
and governed to drive motivations of external complementors  remain incomplete. My
research aims to further explore the gap between these two theoretical domains, illustrated by
the red dashes arrows in figure 6 below.
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Figure 6. Theoretical framework
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3 METHODOLOGY
This chapter reviews the methodology of my research. Firstly, I introduce and explain the
research approach, which is then followed by a discussion about research methods, including
data collection and data analysis. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the research
from the quality and ethical points of view
3.1 Research approach
According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), research philosophy guides the research
strategy and chosen methods. Therefore, I will first explain the philosophical assumptions to
understand why I chose to conduct my study with certain methods. In this case, the
philosophical position I adopted is best described as critical realism. Critical realists argue that
to explain a phenomenon we need to understand the social structures and actors involved
because our knowledge of reality is a product of social conditioning (Saunders, Lewis &
Thornhill, 2009). The aim is to explain and answer what caused certain events to happen  or
in other words, to understand and describe the world as truthfully as possible (Easton, 2010).
Therefore, researchers who adopt a critical realism position encourage alternative, even
competing, explanations as well as using various theoretical lenses to interpret data (Woodside
& Wilson, 2003). Easton (2010) even suggests that critical realism is specifically fit to
understand complex phenomena such as a network of connected organizations. Thus, it is a
suitable philosophy for this study because MaaS is an emerging social phenomenon and a
platform that connects various stakeholders.
Following the research philosophy, the study is conducted by using an induction research
approach. Because Mobility-as-a-Service is a relatively new concept with limited prior
research, my study aims to expand existing theories and potentially generate new ones. For that
purpose, an inductive approach is said to be more suitable than a deductive one. Firstly, an
inductive approach allows new theory and concepts to be developed based on empirical data.
Moreover, it is applicable when the study is qualitative and it requires flexibility to permit
alternative interpretations and allow researchers to closely examine the phenomenon and its
social context (Saunders et al., 2009).
Next, case study research method is chosen to address the research questions because the
complex nature of the topic makes it challenging to deploy quantitative methods (Easton 2010).
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Eisenhardt (1989) also considers case study approach appropriate for new topic areas, where
little empirical study and prior research exists, because it enables researchers to build new
theories that are novel and testable. Additionally, this study satisfies the three conditions
proposed by Yin (2003) to justify a case study approach. Firstly, my research question focuses
on the explanatory aspect of the research problem, at  to
reveal why transport service providers join a MaaS ecosystem and how a MaaS operator can
influence it. Secondly, Yin (2003) highlights that case study research permits the context of
the phenomenon to be explored, a factor that I deem important because the MaaS ecosystem is
still evolving and it is conditioned by numerous uncertain factors of its environmental context.
Dubbois and Gadde (2002) also agree that a contemporary phenomenon needs to be studied in
its real-life context through an in-depth case study. Lastly, case study method is valid when
researchers cannot manipulate the behaviors of involved stakeholders (Yin, 2003).
The case study in this thesis is an intensive embedded single case study (Yin 2003). It is
intensive because the aim is to produce a holistic and rich description of a single case  the
MaaS ecosystem in the Helsinki capital region (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). It is an
embedded single case study because within the broad context of Mobility-as-a-Service, the
focal unit of analysis is the MaaS platform. Additionally, the study also involves several
embedded units of analysis which are service providers who provide mobility solutions for the
platform. The purpose is to understand the MaaS concept from multiple angles and thus
strengthen and expand the insights about the case (Yin, 2003).
As mentioned above, the unit of analysis of this study is a MaaS platform. In their 2016 study,
Kamargianni et al. (2016) identified fifteen MaaS systems around the world. According to their
integration index that measures the integration level of the MaaS systems based on four
dimensions: ticket, payment, information, and communication technology (ICT) and mobility
package, the Whim app operated by MaaS Global Oy in Helsinki Finland ranked the highest.
However, I would like to emphasize the MaaS concept is in its initial phase of the hype cycle.
It is a cycle that all new technology has to go through when being introduced to the market
(Gartner Research, 2003). The cycle starts when a new product/service gains increasing
attention and visibility, then it reaches its peak, which is then followed by a drop before
entering the so-called slope of enlightenment  to finally get to a stable stage. In other words,
the MaaS concept has a long way to go before it matures, presenting a wide variety of topics
to learn more about this innovative phenomenon (Kamargianni & Matyas, 2017).
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Kamargianni and Matyas (2017) refer to the MaaS phenomenon as an ecosystem and they are
rightfully so. MaaS consists of four pillars and four major actor groups. All those elements are
interactive and interdependent to one another and their alignment is crucial to the success of
MaaS. The four pillars are business models, technology, end-user, and policy framework. The
four actor groups include political actors who specify regulations and policies to enable the
MaaS market, the mobility service providers (MSPs) who provide the actual physical transport,
end-users, and the MaaS operator, who is the new actor responsible for integrating multimodal
transport modes and providing mobility packages to customers through a unified interface. The
MaaS ecosystem framework is illustrated in Figure 7 below.
Figure 7. MaaS ecosystem framework (Kamargianni & Matyas, 2017)
As depicted in the above figure, MaaS concept is broad and it is not realistic to cover all in the
s, my research studies the business side of MaaS
ecosystem because it is the most relevant to my academic background. In terms of actor groups,
my focus is on the partnership between the service providers and MaaS operator. This
partnership determines the value that a MaaS ecosystem offers to end-users and therefore, it
determines the success of the whole concept (ibid). I decided not to include political actors
because they play a more passive role in the ecosystem. I also do not include end-users because
understanding the demand side has been the main emphasis of previous studies (Atkins, 2015),
leaving the supply side relatively under-researched. The basic assumption here is that the more
transport service providers engage with a MaaS operator, the more attractive MaaS offerings
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become to consumers.
I choose MaaS Global Oy (Whim app) as the case company because 1) it demonstrates the
highest integration level of a MaaS ecosystem and 2) Whim app entered its commercialized
phase at the end of 2017. The fact that it is not a pilot but is run like a business is a great
advantage because empirical research is also based on what is happening instead of
hypothetical discussions. The sub-units of analysis are transport service providers who already
join the ecosystem and who have not joined but potentially could in the future. Overall, I would
argue that choosing MaaS Global Oy as the focal firm provides positive contributions to a
better understanding of MaaS concept in particular, and platform business in general.
3.2 Data collection
I used mainly semi-structured interviews to collect empirical data. Eriksson and Kovalainen
(2008) argue that semi-structured interviews
question types. Saunders et al. (2009) indeed agree that semi-structured interviews would be a
great choice for exploratory study. Because the concept Mobility-as-a-service is relatively new,
each interviewee could have his or her own understanding and interpretation. Therefore, a pre-
prepared list of interview questions was needed to ensure that the themes and topics discussed
in each interview were relevant and consistent. At the same time, semi-structured interviews
gave me the flexibility to skip some questions, ask additional exploratory and targeted
questions or change the question order, all of which were necessary to ensure natural
conversation flow (ibid).
The interview guide for platform participants was developed based on the literature review and
the guidance of my thesis supervisor. The main purpose was to ensure that all relevant topics
would be covered and that there would be no biases or leading questions. I intentionally kept
the questions broad and open ended in order to obtain as much information as possible. The
interview guide consists of three main themes: 1) Introduction and background information, 2)
View on Mobility-as-a-Service concept, and 3) Motivations to join a MaaS platform. It is also
worth noting that my data collection approach was flexible, meaning that I started to review
and analyze the interview results during data collection phase. It allowed me to adjust the
interview questions to be more suitable to the context. For instance, when I realized that MaaS
Global was not a full-fledged platform with distinctive tools and features, I removed questions
that asked specifically about platform design and instead, added questions about generic
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motivational factors. Additionally, while the three themes remain the same, the question
wordings were adapted depending on whether the interviewees were a part of MaaS ecosystem
or not. Lastly, a separate set of questions were formed to interview the CEO of MaaS Global
because the objective was to understand the MaaS business model from the perspective of the
platform owner. The interview guide can be found in Appendix 1.
In total I conducted ten semi-structured interviews between March  August 2018, of which
one interview was with the founder of MaaS Global, Sampo Hietanen, and the other nine
interviews were with representatives from transport service providers. At the time the
interviews were conducted, six transport service providers already partnered with Whim and
three of them had not.  I first approached Sampo Hietanen in the beginning of 2018 to express
my interest in writing my Mr. Hietanen then put me in touch
with the Head of Partnering, who then helped me to recruit the first six interviewees through
their existing partner network. The main selection criteria were that the interviewees were from
organizations that offer mobility services and should have knowledge and experience with
MaaS or new mobility solutions in general. Furthermore, I interviewed two additional transport
service providers, who decided not to join the platform when MaaS Global reached out to them.
My main argument was that the perspective of the service providers who did not join the
platform were equally important to that of those who did. Being able to understand both sides
would allow me to avoid bias and gain holistic insights into the case. Lastly, based on the
findings of the previous interviews, I reached out to one last service provider, who could be
considered as relevant for the future development of MaaS Global, even though his company
did not provide transport solution for passengers. Table 4 below shows the complete list of
interviewees.
Table 4. Meta-data on interviews
N Organization Participant Code
1 MaaS Global (Whim) Sampo Hietanen, CEO MaaS operator
2 Automotive company Head of Mobility Partner 1
3 Automotive company MaaS Cooperation coordinator Partner 2
4 Public transport service Director, Customer experience and sales Partner 3
5 Traditional transport provider Director New Business Partner 4
6 Traditional transport provider Head of Business Development and IT Partner 5
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7 Traditional transport provider Production Manager Partner 6
8 Traditional transport provider Business Owner Non-partner 1
9 App-based mobility service Program Director, Mobility Services Non-partner 2
10 App-based food delivery Co-founder, Head of Internal Development Non-partner 3
The interview duration was between 30 to 60 minutes. For the purpose of transcribing and data
analysis, all interviews were recorded with my mobile device and I informed the participants
at the beginning of each interview to gain their permission. Additionally, I ensured the
interviewees that their discussions would be kept anonymous and no direct quote would be
linked to their names or their organizations. In terms of location, I conducted seven interviews
face-to-
were done via phone due to the availability and preference of the participants. In terms of
language, all interviews were conducted in English because it was our only common language.
Some interviewees were more comfortable with English than the others but overall everyone
was used to working and communicating in English. To minimize potential misunderstandings
caused by language barriers, I paraphrased the interviewees and always concluded the
interviews with a short summary to make sure that their ideas were understood and captured
correctly. This approach allowed me to skip the translation step in data analysis stage and avoid
any loss of meaning, thus, improving the overall quality of data interpretation.
3.3 Data analysis
Aiming to interpret the meaning of empirical evidence, my data analysis process follows the
typical steps of qualitative content analysis, which are transcribing, within-interview analysis,
cross-interview analysis and synthesizing. The first step was to transcribe the recorded audio
to written words, which was done right after each interview. This step allows me to analyze
the data more systematically and precisely instead of relying on memory (Rubin & Rubin,
2012).
The second step was to study each interview individually to gain a deeper understanding and
identify unique perspectives of each participant (Eisenhardt, 1989). Notable quotations were
highlighted, and my initial impressions of the findings were remarked to be examined further.
To capture key concepts, I used primarily conventional content analysis approach to allow
categories and themes to emerge naturally from the data without imposing pre-defined
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categories. This approach is particularly suitable for a novel topic with limited existing theory
like MaaS. insights
and knowledge are tightly connected to the actual data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). After
reviewing each interview, I added a short summary with key points to make it easier to compare
across interviews, which brings us to the third step  cross-interview analysis.
Eisenhardt (1989) emphasizes that cross-interview analysis is crucial to improve the accuracy
and reliability of the generated theory. Indeed, by searching for similarities and differences
across interviews, I was able to look at the data from multiple angles. Initial impressions were
compared and challenged, which helped to avoid premature and biased conclusions. In this
step, the main challenge was to structure and combine the categories identified in step two to
bigger categories, a challenge that required a directed approach to content analysis. A directed
approach enabled a more systematic process by using dimensions suggested by existing
literature to guide the development of key categories and sub-categories (Hsieh & Shannon,
2005). Essentially, a combination of conventional and directed content analysis permitted new
insights and concepts to emerge from empirical data while simultaneously validated and
extended existing theoretical framework.
The final step is to synthesize the findings and arrive to conclusions. This step is a continuously
iterative process of comparing theory and data. Some relationships between existing theory
and data were confirmed, while others were challenged and revised. Both are critical to
establish good theory. Supporting findings improve confidence in the validity of theory, while
conflicting findings motivate the researcher to look for alternative explanations which sharpen
and enrich theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).
3.4 Research evaluation
To evaluate the quality of my research, I used three tests proposed by Yin (2009): construct
validity, reliability and external validity. These tests are typically used to determine the quality
of empirical social study and hence, they are valid for case study research. Construct validity
refers to whether the measures used to study the topics are suitable. Reliability determines the
degree of transparency in research conduct which enables the study to be repeated. External
validity means the generalizability of the findings. Yin (2009) also proposes the fourth test
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internal validity, which means establishing a causal relationship between the conditions.
However, since this is an exploratory study, this test is not applicable.
To improve construct validity, I based my study in existing and high-quality research. Not only
I studied platform theory, I also explored motivation and open innovation literature. By using
multiple theoretical lenses, I am confident that relevant and valid measures were used to study
the research topic. To ensure reliability, all steps involved in conducting this study were
properly documented, including detailed explanations of the research approach and analysis
methods. It is worth noting, however, that if the study would be replicated in the future, the
results might differ because the perspectives could be time- and context-specific.
The external validity of my research results could be argued to be rather good because most of
the findings are confirmed by existing study. However, I acknowledge that the extent of
generalizability is still somewhat limited due to two reasons. Firstly, this is a case study
focusing on one organization and the interview sample is relatively small. Secondly, the case
company itself possesses unique characteristics of a startup operating in a newly emerging
market (Saunders et al., 2009). While this setting provides an opportunity to gain deep
understanding and rich insights into the researched phenomenon, it is hard to conclude whether
the results would be applicable for other organizations. Further research with more cases, for
example, with a more established case company or in a different geographical market or in a
different industry, are needed to test the results and improve their generalizability (Yin, 2009).
Finally, Saunders et al. (2009) define ethics as the appropriateness of your behavior in
relation to the rights of those who become the subject of your work, or are affected by it . This
means to treat other researchers and research participants respectfully. Specifically, I spent a
great amount of effort to make sure that past research used in this study was quoted and cited
properly. Additionally, recording the interviews was done with the consent of the interviewees.
Summary of key points in each interview was presented to the participants to ensure accuracy
of data.
throughout the entire process, enhancing the ethicality of my study further.
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4 FINDINGS
This chapter presents the findings of my empirical research. Firstly, I introduce the viewpoints
of the interview participants on the future of mobility. Secondly, I present key findings about
drivers that encourage
platform contributors, namely transport service providers, to join a platform ecosystem, in this
case the Whim app. Finally, I present the concerns that potentially discourage platform
participation. I divide the chapter into sub-chapters to provide clarity and logic reading flow.
All findings are supported by direct quotes from interview participants which were extracted
from the transcribed interviews.
4.1 Towards the future of mobility
Most service providers participated in the interviews agreed that the transportation industry is
changing. Specifically, it is said that car ownership will decrease because urbanization makes
it increasingly difficult and expensive to own a car.
 (Partner 5)
Changes in customer preferences and in legislations were also highlighted as the key factors to
disrupt the industry. These two factors will be explored in more details in the next sub-chapter.
Additionally, technological advancement and new types of competitor were also outlined as
contributing factors.
New players are coming, not only MaaS players, but also more traditional players also
in our current business market. We see this kind of big change both as challenge and
opportunity. We are ready for it, from mindset point of view and also from the technical
capabilities and service capabilities so we are ready for the competition. (Partner 5)
 There
are many ongoing projects, e.g.  (Partner 6)
It is noticeable that the majority of interview participants expressed positive attitude towards
change. Instead of resisting, they accepted that change is coming and that they need to adapt
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their current business models. One service provider openly acknowledged that the mindset
needs to move from product-oriented to service-oriented.
 (Non-partner
1)
Several service providers also showed that they understood the potential benefits of new
mobility solutions, such as MaaS, which integrate various transportation modes in the same
move around, with or without an app. I like to
more out of the existing resources, so increase efficiency in transport system and at the
same time offer better cus  (Non-partner
2)
While all interview participants agreed that change is coming, they had different opinions on
how fast the change would manifest. Some said that it was very close now, while others said
that it was only a hype and we need to wait and see what will happen.
and it mostly stays in our parking area, so it does not make a lot of sense. Economically,
there is no point of having a car, so it is very interesting to see when the MaaS service gets
so good that I would give up my own car, I think it i  (Non-partner 1)
at it is not going to decrease with a speed that MaaS
hype believes. I have seen different estimates that probably car ownership in dense cities
will decrease. It is not going to be fast in the short-run but perhaps in the long run it can
be much more dram  (Partner 3)
4.2 Mobility-as-a-
The sub-chapter provides an understanding of the vision and business model of the Whim
app, the case company that serves as an example of MaaS.
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Vision
When asked about how he saw Whim app in the future, the CEO of MaaS Global, Mr. Sampo
Hietanen, used the analogy of a mobile operator to describe his vision.
W
care of all their trips and mobility needs. The idea of that is to be comparable with a
Throughout the interview, he repeatedly emphasized that he considered Whim as a service
provider, as opposed to a reseller or a platform.
Our business logic is not to make 50 different TSPs available and show them to the end
We see Whim as neither reseller nor platform, more like a service provider. We provide a
complete service, and in order to do that we provide the mobility service from different
components. The idea is we, as a service provider, will select the right pieces for you
instead of just presenting you all kinds of options. Operator business might be a better
analogy.
He envisioned that there would be three levels of evolution of the Whim app. The first level is
to take care of mobility need. The second level is to provide service level. The third level is to
provide entertainment and experience during the commute.
First, it is a one-stop shop, that you pay as you go. In the next level, we can give you the
service promise, e.g. pickup time, certain service level. After that, it becomes much more
about how we entertain you, what kind of experience do we give during your travel.
For instance, if there would be some companies who can make sure that every morning you
get your favorite coffee at the platform then we definitely would love to add that to the
service.
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Essentially, he imagined that in the future the experience during transportation would be more
important than the transportation itself.
. You start to care
much more about the 90 mins you spend there and what we can offer you in those 90mins.
And the whole transportation becomes the background issue in that
Mr. Hietanen, states that to be up and running, a Mobiliy-as-a-Service requires three basic
transport modes: public transportation, taxis or taxi-like services, and car access. Bike access
is also considered important in many cities.
 as a core both in cities and intercity. Because
public transportation alone -like service
(share/non-share) to give more diversity and more supply-density in that sense. Then we
definitely need access to cars. There are different forms of access to car that we need (short-
term for within the city, a bit longer term would be daily or weekly usage for getting out of
the city).
Also, it seems that in the areas where we operate, access to bike seems to be more and more
relevant.
Mr. Hietanen added an additional fifth element which he described as something cool to get
people excited about the service.
The fifth element is omething
going but to get people excited we need something more. Something that is locally available,
something
special ferry or Segway or motorcycles or extremely fancy cars.
Currently service providers could plug-in to Whim ecosystem through API.
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 providers that just plug-in. It means that you plug-in to the API,
sign a standard contracts, which then
In terms of pricing, Whim purchases the services from transport service providers and then
Whim charges users different prices for different service packages.
Our main logic is that the transport service providers might not want to price commission-
based, rather towards Whim as production-based (price per kilometer, hours, and so on)
and we price according to service levels.
Furthermore, Whim aims to include different components in the service packages to increase
more public transports.
. The more of those add-ons services, services
that users do not really use but value a lot to have in the package, the better chance we
have in making profits because we can show to the users the face value of the higher priced
package.
t the same time, the more we can nudge users to the cheaper kilometer (walking, biking,
public transport),
We incentivize people with different rewards.
Finally, Mr. Hietanen recommended transport service providers to focus on improving their
service offers to be competitive and avoid becoming commoditized.
The change in logic is that price is not the only element. Other elements would become
increasingly important, such as location, service quality, experience. Such elements will
start to play much bigger roles in the future. How good of a plug-in is your transportation
becomes more relevant to compete on in that space. Current transport service providers
have to create their own sales channels, so they compete much more on getting attention
of the users instead of how good their services plug-
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4.3 Factors that encourage service providers to join a MaaS platform
Representatives of service providers were asked what would motivate them to participate in a
MaaS ecosystem. A number of key factors are identified, and then clustered into seven bigger
themes: Industry trends, Business opportunities, Reputation and credibility, Learning, Partner
relationship, Social contribution, and Transparency and convenience. The details are described
in the following sub-sections.
Industry trends
The changes happening in the transportation industry help to explain why service providers
perceive new mobility solutions, such as MaaS, positively. Six out of nine service providers
highlighted the changes in customer preference, especially in younger generations. Specifically,
decrease in car ownership and driving license, increasing concerns for the environment and
increased share of public transportation usage are among the key elements that signify the
future mobility landscape.
changes in cities and in younger generation's needs and wants. Young generations do not
want to own a car anymore. Some of them do not even have driving license so they only use
public transport and taxi services. They only need cars once in a while. They do not see
 (Partner 4)
, we are moving from ownership to sharing so socialization is the big trend
behind MaaS. People are seeing that it does not make much sense in owning something
that they only use a fraction of time. So, all this future mobility and the changing trends
affect business in car financing and car insurance and we want to serve the future
 (Non-partner 2)
Additionally, under the public concerns about environmental issues and increasing pressure on
existing urban infrastructure, governments, and specifically Finnish government, have made
legislation changes that enable favorable environment for new mobility solutions such as MaaS.
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 in large cities is that there are too many cars right now. Legislations
are changing towards that direction. Everyone is saying that, governments, cities, we
 (Partner 1)
Such changes in both customer preferences and legislation motivate service providers to take
actions to transform their current business model to prepare for future disruptions. One service
provider specifically talked about new types of competitors who are not traditional
transportation players but come from high-tech industry.
competitors more broadly, e.g. Google, Amazon. Even though they are not in car business,
they might be in the future and when they come, it is going to disrupt the retail business.
To tackle that risk, we need to be part of a bigger platforms and together they can compete
with those tech-native giants. We have to be part of several ecosystems because if we will
not, somebody will and that is  (Partner 1)
Considering the changing market landscape, we are aware that we need to change our
business model in the future. It is a top-down strategic decision that we need to transform
ourselves to a mobility company, not just a car manufacturing company. We do not
necessarily know what 'mobility' business actually means though. But that is why we are
here, to learn more if it is going to happen or not. Basically, we are trying to search for
signals, if this and this companies are successful it would mean that this phenomenon is
now going forward. (Partner 2)
Financial gains
All service providers agreed that potential financial gain was the first and foremost important
factor that influences the decision to join a MaaS platform. Financial benefits can be gained by
increasing volume from either additional sales channel or new customer segment.
telecom industry for example. If people spend like 30EUR per month for telecom then they
spend 300-500EUR for traveling and for moving from A to B. It is really huge business.
(Partner 2)
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company, so it is important that we make profits, for our drivers and also for
ourselves. The money is always behind the decision.  (Partner 6)
the costs. It is the main criteria. It always comes back to the business figures. We need to
see that it makes sense business wise to join a MaaS platform. It needs to have a value and
(Non-partner 2)
easily. It is more about increase income with new customers. The new income has to be big
 (Non-partner 3)
Firstly, six service providers perceive MaaS platform as an additional sales channel through
which they can reach more customers and thus increase revenues. Two out of three service
providers who have not yet partnered with MaaS Global (non-partner) emphasized that a
sizable customer base would play a big role in their decision-making.
be a part of,
just like other location brokers. We have already quite a lot of locations (brokers) where
volume customers came in. Thus, from our viewpoint it is not much change in service, so it
 (Partner 4)
The more trips to us, the better. The more channels there are, the more services we are
in, the better. We can see that we are getting more trips and more revenue. With good
pricing, there is no problem in it. It is always a good thing to have more trips for our drivers.
So far, there has been a moderate growth in trips which contributes to revenue. (Partner
5)
Shanghai, or Bangkok that we can see that by doing this integration and partnership we
can reach millions more of people right away then it would be a big reason enough for us
 (Non-partner 3)
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It is no surprise that most service providers expressed their openness to be part of multiple
MaaS platforms because the more channels they are part of, the better chance they have to
reach more customers. Additionally, multihoming cost is considered minimal because from the
technical viewpoint, once the integration is done with one partner it does not take much effort
to repeat it for other partners. Lastly, service providers are motivated to join multiple platforms
because MaaS is still a relatively new concept and they are uncertain which player would be
the winner.
We see that it is wise to have many channels, so we do not "put all your eggs in one
basket". We see MaaS as a new kind of sales channel, so we are open to part of new
ecosystems too. We already have the knowledge and have learned a lot with MaaS Global,
so it will not be that big of an investment. We will check the case: how much work it takes,
how much profit we can expect. Of course, we don't want to jump to everything. If there is
something good, we are open for collaboration. But we do not say no, that is for sure.
(Partner 1)
n the interface and we said, please different players, MaaS Global and others
(similar international companies), if you want to try, there is business opportunity put in
Helsinki region. We definitely hope that different players will take our ticket in their
package, whether it is MaaS Global, MoveIt, Google, Transcent from China, event
organizers, tourists, etc. We said also to Turku, Tampere, which have their own mobile
 (Partner 3)
we can consider joining them too. There are always some costs involved in integration. But
 (Partner 4)
When choosing among several MaaS platforms to participate in, several service providers
highlighted that pricing is the decisive factor because it directly affects the business case and
potential financial gain from the partnership.
but they are too low cost. From economic side, it is not affordable and not enough to
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(Partner 6)
Additionally, several service providers see MaaS as an opportunity to reach completely new
customer groups, who do not normally use their services. The new segments are said to be
either car owners or local citizens. Therefore, these service providers are keen to support MaaS
because a growth in MaaS means an increase in the overall market.
base. Traditionally, our customers are those who fly to a new place and needs a car there.
So we see MaaS as an opportunity to offer our services to local users who actually live and
work in Helsinki, who probably do not own a car, who use mainly public transport and taxi
services for commuting, and maybe once in a while need a car (visit relatives, carry big
 (Partner 4)
Companies like MaaS Global give us an opportunity to target new customer segment:
people who currently own cars. Their business is to help people choosing mass transport
instead of personal cars. Thus, we are of course happy to partner with them. It is their
business to push people to mass transport and that is good for our business  (Non-partner
1)
It is worth noting that even though financial benefit is one of the most important factors, the
majority of service providers do not expect immediate gains and express their willingness to
wait for delayed paid-off in the future.
hopefully slowly we're shifting towards making it profitable. (Partner 1)
, the focus is not to become rich or make a lot of money immediately, that is not our
target. Maybe in the future. Of course, when we invest money in something we expect to
get our money back one way or another. But now is not the time, perhaps in the future
(Partner 2)
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 does not provide so many trips yet, about 200 trips per month (we have
400k trips per month in total). It is not a big part of our business but even then we are keen
on working with MaaS Global. Of course, when there is no benefit anymore then we have
 (Partner 6)
Reputation and credibility
Besides direct financial benefits, many service providers mentioned that they enjoyed the spill-
over publicity and positive recognition surrounding the MaaS topic.
The hype and PR side of this, it has also value. Organizations around the world are quite
interested to see what is happening here [in Helsinki]. (Partner 3)
Some service providers explicitly mentioned that being part of a MaaS platform is an
inexpensive marketing way to increase their brand visibility and to target new customer groups.
Additionally, two service providers revealed that positive employer branding  being perceived
as innovative and sustainable  would improve their image and help them to recruit young
people.
marketing (e.g. ads on bus stop), it is expensive to reach new customer groups - people who
normally use public transport and do not own a car. We find being part of Whim is even
 (Partner 4)
as old and conservative company, so it is good for our
image to be associated with an  (Non-partner 1)
A few service providers pointed out that the MaaS operator needs to have a credible reputation
because it would provide a sense of trust and comfortability for them to enter the partnership.
When you do a partnership decision, you need to look at the holistic picture. If it is a
controversial company who have faced public scandals, a partnership with them would
affect to our image and we care about how our customers see us. If the partners have good
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reputation and very polish image, it means doing a partnership would also improve our
image from customer point of view (Non-partner 3)
Learning
Five service providers particularly emphasized how much they valued the learning aspect of
joining a MaaS platform. Some perceived it as an opportunity to scan and explore new
possibilities in transportation industry. All players are aware that the world is changing and
that they need to adapt to respond to new customer needs. However, no one knows which idea
would be the winning one or which direction is the right one to pursuit. Being part of MaaS
gave them the front seat to see how things will unfold and how the future of mobility will look
like.
 whole thing works, how this company
works, what are the business opportunities in this industry. The second priority is to really
find new business cases  (Partner 2)
Additionally, innovation spill-over and the possibility to develop new services were mentioned
by four service providers. Being part of a MaaS ecosystem allows them to focus on their core
services while building new digital capabilities.
sense for us to join a platform and collaborate to develop new services. We see the potential
to innovate new products for MaaS ecosystem. Together with Whim, we have been testing
(Partner 1)
close ourselves. We do not have so much money to develop our own project and capabilities.
We understand that we are one part of this whole transportation system, including train,
buses, own cars, etc. MaaS Global is connecting them all. (Partner 6)
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One non-partner openly said that they would be highly interested if they could leverage the
technical platform and customer base of Whim to test and develop new services to complement
their core business.
an develop new
services together so that it would not be just them selling our tickets. It is an opportunity
for us to develop service ourselves then push to the MaaS app. We can then leverage their
systems to gain information and test trial on their operator app so we basically develop
 (Non-partner 1)
Two service providers also pointed out that they leveraged the initiative with MaaS Global to
change the working culture within their companies to be more innovative.
(Partner 1)
transportation. Even if you are not so good in innovating yourself, you should keep other
in  (Non-partner 1)
However, it is worth noting that all these service providers mentioned above are traditional
transport players who are still operating with old legacy systems. When being asked the same
question, two born-digital service providers did not make any remarks on the potential learning
benefits of joining a MaaS ecosystem. In fact, one of them explicitly said that she did not see
much learning benefits.
development.  (Non-partner 2)
Partner relationship
Quite many service providers pointed out that the support of MaaS Global has been a crucial
factor to ensure smooth integrations with straightforward testing and trial phases. Being able
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to have dialogues to solve emerging problems as equal partners was highlighted as a key
factor to build trust and have positive collaborations.
The cooperation with MaaS Global works quite smoothly. When we have a problem, we
 (Partner 4)
ated resources from the new partners.
 (Non-
partner 3)
One service provider openly talked about how MaaS Global supported them to promote this
new concept to their drivers. Such action was highly appreciated by the service provider
because it illustrated mutual respect and shared goals between the partners.
 to the drivers and explain
that MaaS is good for drivers and they will get more money. We have had events with
drivers and MaaS Global have participated in those events. We have something called
Whim driver of the month and we give small gifts to the drivers. MaaS Global respects
their partners to work together, it shows that we as an operator are at an equal level and
that we can discuss with one another. When there are problems, both sides jointly solve it
because we have the same goal. That is very good.  (Partner 6)
Social contribution
Being able to contribute to greater environmental and societal causes was mentioned by two
service providers as one motivation for them to join MaaS ecosystem. The contribution is
related to transportation specifically and it is at the core of the vision and mission of MaaS
concept: to provide an alternative solution to private cars to move people from A to B in a more
sustainable and environmental-friendly way.
that would help people for trip change and would ease the switch from car to public
transportation. If the future will be developed in a way that it would extremely seamless for
people to use public transportation whenever they are, effortless, and enable people to give
52
up car ownership and take sustainable solution, that is definitely something we are looking
 (Partner 3)
better the world will be in general. To make the world a better place, we should cooperate
and make new business together to reduce the number of cars  (Non-partner 1)
Transparency and convenience
One born-digital service provider, who provides its food delivery service via mobile
application, clearly stated that he expected the platform to have clear instructions and
communication to support technical integration. Transparent and fair earning logic was also
mentioned as one of the criteria to choose which platform to participate in.
should be really easy from technical point of view. The platform needs to be managed
well, meaning very clear and fair, so you know when you join the platform you can easily
 (Non-partner 3)
4.4 Factors that discourage service providers to join a MaaS platform
Service providers were also asked about the barriers that might prevent them from joining a
MaaS platform. Three major concerns are identified and described in the sub-sections below.
Cost consideration
While financial gains are the key incentive for service providers to join a MaaS platform, cost
consideration is the key barrier. Cost consideration refers to not only literal money but also
time and effort. It includes development costs, maintenance costs and most importantly,
technical integration costs. Specifically, six out of nine interviewees highlighted that API
integration is the biggest challenge.
ing is the most complicated, it is the main barrier and most expensive. Data is much
easier. But each region, city and country has come up with its own ticket solution, which
means the amount of work for integration is extremely high. The technological barrier can
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be quite challenging. Unless we can somehow harmonize digital ticket solution around the
world. But so far there has not  (Partner 3)
based on old legacy system. How to keep up with new thinking and how to build up the API
 (Partner 4)
 it without any big change in our core focus
area, then it might be interesting to have a chat. But from our experience, doing any kind
 (Non-partner 3)
Additionally, cost consideration refers to opportunity cost. All three non-partners of Whim
mentioned that prioritizing limited resources is one factor they need to consider carefully
before making partnership decision. They explained that often the companies have other
priorities in the agenda and thus there is no resource left to start a MaaS initiative.
We are working in a small group, so we need to focus and prioritize. We have 1-2 key
focus on developing the actual services. That is why we have not joined any of the MaaS
ecosystem  (Non-partner 2)
money) so you want
to spend your resources on things that bring you the most benefits and most profits. When
considering a partnership, the key consideration is the opportunity cost: if we do this then
we cannot do something else, and usually the something else is more important to us, so
we concentrate on that. Doing integration with a partner that is smaller than us or same
size as us means a lot of work without guarantee for profit/benefits. Then we would rather
just concentrate on our own game.  (Non-partner 3)
Lastly, cost consideration also refers to potential risk of cannibalizing current business. Only
three service providers mentioned it. One was concerned particularly about pricing but in
general cannibalization was not considered as a major risk that would have significant impact
on their decision-making.
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e do not want to cannibalize our own business. The current rate is cheaper than what
we have for our corporate users. It is hard to explain to our corporate users that we have
a cheaper price for Whim. We need to explain that it is a different business model. We
differentiate the business between Whim and normal business. So that is one challenge.
(Partner 4)
 not think that it is a big
 (Partner 5)
Control
Concerns about control and decision rights were raised by many service providers. It is
noticeable that all three non-partners shared similar remark in this aspect, indicating that it
might play a significant role in preventing service providers from joining a MaaS platform.
Specifically, the concerns are related to four aspects: negotiation power on pricing, ownership
of customers, control of data, and brand recognition.
Firstly, service providers stated that negotiation power and especially control on pricing is a
major concern. Service providers are not used to letting someone else set the price for their
services. There is a general fear that their margin would eventually diminish due to competition
and a lack of control over their own pricing. In general, it is perceived that the pricing process
could have been explained more clearly to provide a sense of transparency and fairness.
the right to make decisions about it. If you are on the platform, do you even have the right
to say? If you are just the provider, how much can you ask for, do you get to ask this and
this if you get business/revenue anyway from the platform. MaaS Global invests a lot in
marketing to buy customers and buy stuffs from the providers. Can Whim be like we have
a good platform, give us the price, and we do whatever we want? Is it going to change?
(Partner 1)
[another service provider] sets
up the price because they are the one who funds MaaS Global, so they discuss with each
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the price is not yet set, but now it seems to be set the price level, in our opinion is quite low
so there is not much profit for operators. We do not have much influence on the price. It is
a game changer that somebody else would set up the price for us  (Partner 4)
Secondly, all three non-partners stressed that they would like to own the interactions and
relationships with their customers. They explained that it was necessary to provide good service
experience.
nd offer the
 (Non-partner 2)
[party 1] and for [party 2]
because that is our competitive edge  to be good at what we do and provide good
experience for all parties. That is why we are not big fan of partnering with other
(Non-partner 3)
Although having the same concern, one non-partner pointed out that joining a MaaS platform
does not necessarily mean a loss of customer relationship because it can be shared by both
parties.
customers is outdated. But it should be taken into account in the beginning of the
(Non-partner 1)
Thirdly, in the era in which data is the key to unlock new revenue streams, it is no wonder that
the question who owns the data was brought up. Two service providers said that at the very
least they needed the data to operate their services efficiently.
 (Non-partner 2)
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Lastly, two service providers discussed the risk of losing brand recognition and becoming
commoditized services which are offered under the MaaS operator brand. It will potentially
reduce their margin and consequently profitability if the services are no longer competitively
differentiated.
eventually have products with our own brands within the platform.
Otherwise, we produce the basic service, they [MaaS operator] will sell it under their
brand [Whim] and get all the credits. Do we want to be just a provider, or do we want to
build our own product? That is the thought we have to think about when it comes to
 (Partner 1)
 operators have then we will
eventually end up in a situation where we are just selling a bulk-type product and the MaaS
 (Non-partner 1)
Uncertainty
Five service providers expressed their doubts about the success of MaaS. Even when they
believe in the concept, they do not necessarily believe that MaaS Global / Whim app is the
winning player. It is understandable because MaaS is still a relatively noble idea and is going
through different development phases. The concerns mainly focus on feasible business case,
low population and density of Finland and scalability
Firstly, even though the Whim app is said to be one of the most advanced MaaS application,
the company itself was not yet profitable by the time the thesis was conducted in early 2018. It
would potentially explain why service providers are hesitant about investing in MaaS initiative.
S
one challenge  (Non-partner 2)
they can make it to be something sustainable and robust is to remain to be (Non-
partner 3)
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Secondly, almost all service providers agreed that Finland with its low population and
dispersed density was a challenge to develop new mobility solutions.
something that Helsinki region
has been blamed in Europe for years. The structure has been much more scattered,
 (Partner 3)
easy to create new services. For this kind of shared services, you need a lot of customers,
i.e. great demand. Helsinki is a big city area with low density. It is difficult to put together
 (Partner 6)
This challenge naturally leads to the conclusion that Whim needs to expand internationally and
to cities with big population to be profitable. However, the nature of transportation is location-
specific. It means that there are various legacy systems and ticket solutions, posing a major
challenge to scale for MaaS operator.
globally, or at least in Europe? It is a fear from our side that times goes by, five years from
now and we are still here in Helsinki and just a couple of cities i (Partner
2)
are digital, and so you can scale fast. Once you have the solution, you can scale, there is
no region barrier. But for transport services, they are extremely local. When you build
something over here, you cannot just replicate it to another city. Those legacy and ticket
 (Partner 3)
ansport operators, so it is not that
 (Non-partner 2)
4.5 Summary of key findings
The following figure summarizes the key findings of this chapter.
Factors Detailed elements
Industry trends
Financial gains
Reputation and credibility
Learning
Partner relationship
Social contribution
Transparency and convenience
Cost consideration
Control
Uncertainty
Changes in customer preferences
Legislation changes
Threat of new competitors from high-tech in
Additional sales channel
New customer segment
Positive spill-over publicity
Targeted marketing to new customer
New business opportunities scanning
and exploration
Innovation spill-over
Trusting and collaborative collaborations
Clear communication
Environmental and societal causes
Support technical integrations
Transparent and fair earning logic
Monetary
Time and effort
Pricing
Ownership of customers
Uncertain success
Feasibility to scale
Figure 8. Encouraging and discouraging factors for platform participation
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5 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
This chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the research findings, an analysis that is done
based on existing literature. The chapter starts by reviewing the MaaS model and the case
company MaaS Global in particular from platform business theoretical viewpoint.
Next, to answer the 1st research question What motivates transport service providers to join a
MaaS ecosystem? , I analyze individual factors that impact platform participation and divide
related to platform design. These individual factors are then grouped into four key factors that
determine whether a service provider would join a platform or not.
Subsequently, to answer the 2nd research question, I discuss concrete levers that a platform
owner can use to attract platform participants. Finally, I present a revised version of previously
introduced theoretical framework.
5.1 Reviewing Mobility-as-a-Service model through platform business lens
While the current articles about MaaS describe MaaS as a platform business, my interviews
with the case company MaaS Global reveal that the current business model is not a platform
business model, at least not yet. To get the business off the ground, MaaS Global starts with a
core offering that comprises public transportation, taxi and car rental [source: interviews].
MaaS Global pre-purchased units, such as kilometers or tickets, from transport service
providers (TSP). They then bundle different modes of transportation and offer various package
levels to consumers. In other words, MaaS Global plays the role of an intermediary between
continuum between pure reseller and pure multi-sided platform (MSP) (Hagiu & Wright, 2013).
e towards the pure reseller
side because the company has significant control over the interactions between consumers and
TSP, such as pricing and service displays, all but the actual service delivery.
There are three reasons why the current business model makes sense: economies of scale,
aggregation effects and consumer experience (Hagiu & Wright, 2013). The current core
offering includes public transportation, taxi and car rental, which are the main transportation
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modes (apart from car ownership) used by people on a daily basic to get from A to B. The
reseller position allows MaaS Global to achieve better economies of scale while taking
advantage of the complementary relationships between these services. Additionally, in each
city, there is a limited number of providers who offer public transportation (mostly just one or
two), taxi (a few big ones that cover the entire city) and car rentals (a handful of global brands).
Because of that, it is unnecessary to deploy MSP business model and it is possible for MaaS
Global to make separate deals with each TSP. More importantly, by aggregating various
transportation modes in one bundle package, MaaS Global ensures a better service experience
for consumers in terms of ticketing, payment and booking because they do not have to deal
with multiple agents.
The next question is then, would a platform business model be suitable for a MaaS operator, in
this case MaaS Global? The vision of MaaS Global is to cover all mobility needs and eventually
replace the need of owning a car. In the next development stage, MaaS Global will offer
complementary transportation modes, such as carpooling, Segway and even hot air balloon.
According to the founders, they are happy to include any existing transport services in a city
in the Whim app (source: interview). This is where it gets interesting because we start to move
towards the so-called long-tail products/services, those that respond to the needs of only a small
niche of customers. The founders also wish to extend MaaS
transportation to include complementary services, such as food delivery, groceries delivery and
even coffee (source: interview). The aim is to customize their service offerings to each
 a scale of customization that is prohibitively difficult for one firm
to offer in-house. As a result, the types of service providers included in the Whim app becomes
increasingly diverse when it reaches the next development stages. Indeed, Kamargianni and
Matyas (2017) shared the same opinion that there are a wide range of services to be included
in a MaaS packages, ranging from WiFi to entertainment services, such as newspapers,
magazines, movies, and gaming services, to Food & Beverage services, such as discount or
subscription to coffeehouses and restaurants.
What stood out from the interviews is that even the founders do not know who the
complementary service providers might be. Two implications can be drawn from the interviews:
1) the need to enable external complementors to join the Whim app without knowing ex-ante
who they might be and 2) the need to harness external services to complement the core service
to tap into niche demands of mobility market. These two implications call for a large and
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diverse ecosystem of external partners instead of a small defined network of supply chain
partners, making it compelling to use the theoretical lens of platform business to examine the
next development stages (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2012; Gawer,
2014; Tiwana, 2013). Furthermore, the more TSP join the Whim app, both in terms of
availability and diversity, the more desirable Whim becomes to consumers. Similarly, the
greater the number of consumers adopt the Whim app, the more valuable it is for TSP to join
Whim. In other words, there are potential positive cross-side network effects, a phenomenon
that many researchers consider as a unique feature of platform business (Tiwana, 2013; Gawer,
2014).
Because of unknown ex-ante complementors, microsegments of the market and potential
network effects, it is possible to posit that the business model of MaaS Global will eventually
become more open and turn to a platform business. Researchers also agree that a platform
business can evolve when it moves from startup to mature stage (Gawer, 2014; Parker & Van
Alstyne, 2017). Tiwana (2013) also highlights that most successful platform businesses start
as stand-alone products or services. Only when they successfully attract one side of the market
do they open the business for the other parties to join in and effectively transform a traditional
business model into a platform one. Choudary (2015) and Parket et al. (2016) also explain that
it is necessary for a platform provider to start out as a traditional business before flipping to
platform model when there is a need to model success and demonstrate that a market exists. I
find this one particularly true in the case of MaaS Global because there are significant technical
and regulatory barriers to aggregate the fragmented transportation markets.
To sum up, the current business model of MaaS Global, with the core offering of public
transportation, taxi and car rental, is not yet a platform business. It is rather a core which might
or might not turn to a platform business model in later stages. However, I posit that the next
two layers of the offerings, as suggested in the vision of the founder (Figure 9), will be served
as a multi-sided platform.
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Figure 9. Illustrative Mobility-as-a-Service development stages
5.2 Motivations
The findings from this study show that motivations to participate in a platform is indeed
heterogenous, both monetary and non-monetary. The four main motivations are 1) Financial
gains, which is expected increasing revenue from new sales channel and new customer segment,
2) Reputation and credibility, which is positive spill-over publicity to enhance brand image, 3)
Learning, which refers to opportunities to explore new business and to develop digital
capability, and 4) Social contribution, which is related to environmental and societal benefits.
Monetary benefits
All interview participants mentioned business opportunities, considering both financial gains
and costs, as one of the main considerations. This finding is supported by various researchers
who emphasize that economic-driven motivation drives platform participation (Tiwana, 2013;
Van Alstyne et al., 2016). Specifically, interviewees highlighted that market access to a sizable
customer base is crucial. Indeed, researchers refer to this phenomenon as network effects,
which is a distinctive character of platform business to achieve growth and scalability (Rochet
& Tirole, 2006; Hagiu, 2006; Evans, 2003). However, it is worth noticing that even when there
is little immediate gain, interviewees express a willingness to wait for potential delayed paid-
63
off in the future. It means that financial benefit, even in a form of a promise, is still a powerful
factor to attract platform participants.
Non-monetary benefits
The study shows that non-monetary factors also motivates participants. Specifically, external
providers are interested when they can benefit from reputation improvement thanks to positive
publicity. Others consider the learning benefits they gain from exploring new business
opportunities and testing new services most appealing. Others join a platform because they
share similar vision in social contributions. These motivations are mentioned in previous
studies of Benbya and Belbaly (2010) and Roberts et al., (2 t is aligned
with the viewpoint of Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015) who confirm that there are various
sources of motivations besides sales incentives.
It is worth noting that while there are various motivations to participate in a platform, those
found in this study lean more towards extrinsic side on the intrinsic-extrinsic continuum. Even
though they are not strictly economic like financial gains, motivations such as reputation and
learning are extrinsic nonetheless and can be best categorized as internalized extrinsic
motivation (Von Krogh et al., 2012). This finding agrees with the insights from Bonaccorsi
and Rossi (2006) who conclude that economic and technological motivations play a decisive
intrinsic and social motivations are more typical for
individual actors.
Additionally, it is important to recognize the impact of external industry trends on motivations.
It is human nature to resist to change, or any disruptions to the status quo (Stevenson &
Moldoveanu, 1995). However, the current trends in transportation industry help transport
service providers to be more receptive towards new mobility solutions, including MaaS.
Specifically, they are well aware of the ongoing changes in customer preferences, the decrease
in car ownership, the rise of public pressure about environmental impact and new legislations.
Therefore, they accept that new trends are coming, their industry is changing and thus, they
need to adapt and take actions to prepare for the future. All these elements contribute to create
a favorable environment for the emergence of new mobility solutions, such as MaaS. This
finding signifies that there is a link between a platform success and the trends in its industry.
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background and capability. While the interview participants mentioned almost all motivations
described in the previous chapter, the emphasis on which motivations are more important is
somewhat varied. Specifically, traditional service providers, such as taxi and car rental
companies, repeatedly highlight the learning benefits to improve their digital capabilities and
develop app-based new services, whereas born-digital players focus more on the size of
customer base and almost neglect the learning aspect of joining a MaaS platform. Similarly,
public players express more interest in the social benefits for citizens and environment than
private ones. This initial finding indicates that and background could
influence its motivations to join a platform and thus, a platform owner could benefit from
tailoring the approach for different groups of actors, as opposed to one-size-fit-all.
Overall, the study highlights there are various sources of motivation to join a platform, which
include both monetary and non-monetary ones. They can be categorized in four main groups:
financial gains, reputation and credibility, learning and social contribution. The study also
reveals that most motivations are extrinsic, but it could be because the interviewees approached
the topic from a firm point of view and thus, overlooked individual intrinsic motivations. Lastly,
but also external industry trends, such as changes in consumer preferences and legislations.
5.3 Platform design
Researchers firmly believe that the platform design, including its architecture and its
governance mechanism, influences the motivations of external players to join a platform. This
sub-chapter will review how those elements are reflected in the findings of this study.
Pricing
Pricing control is one of the main barriers that discourage service providers to join a platform,
they
expect the platform to have a clear and fair earning logic. This factor is understandably
highlighted because it directly impacts potential financial gains. Researchers agree that pricing
is the key incentive to attract external service providers and it should align with the platform
development stage and business model (Hagiu, 2006: Tiwana, 2013).
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In the case study of MaaS Global, the platform owner pre-purchases the services (kilometers
or tickets) from the transport providers and then bundle them to different packages for
consumers. This pricing decision reflects a business model that leans more towards re-seller
than towards multi-sided platform as mentioned in chapter 5.1. A disadvantage of the current
pricing scheme, as revealed from the interviews, is that service providers are not comfortable
with letting someone else price their services. Some interviewees questioned who makes the
decision on pricing and whether it is fair, considering that there are several direct competitors
on the platform and some have closer relationship to the platform owner than the others. It
indicates that the communication on pricing could be improved to be more transparent and to
foster trusting partnerships. Tiwana (2013) suggests that in software system, an ideal pricing
policy allows the platform owner to decide access-based or usage-based fee and external
complementors to price their own products or services. Regardless of which pricing policy is
employed, a platform owner needs to ensure that its pricing is fair and transparent to encourage
platform participation.
The literature also points out that through pricing policies, platform owner can achieve lock-in
effect and thus discourage multi-homing. (Rochet & Tirole, 2003). However, in the case of
MaaS, both the platform owner (Whim app) and the transport service providers explicitly stated
that multihoming is necessary and exclusive contract is not desirable. Therefore, the impact of
pricing on multihoming cannot be concluded in this study.
Transparency and convenience
A smooth and easy technical integration is seen as important in their decision-making. To
support the technical integration, interviewees expect not only well documented interfaces but
also dedicated resources to support trial and testing. several interviewees said
that the support from the platform owner also means clear communication and open dialogues.
Interviewees mentioned that they felt respected by the platform owner and if there was a
problem, they could discuss and solve it together. Cusumano and Gawer (2002) also agreed
that information disclosure is necessary to encourage platform participation because it provides
a sense of transparency and trust between the platform provider and its participants.
Interviewees also h
explaining the vision and the new concept to their employees. It gave a sense of togetherness,
which strengthens the partnership between the platform owner and service providers. This
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evidence shows that partner support goes beyond the technical side of a platform, i.e. interface
is just as crucial to build a trusting and collaborative partnership.
Additionally, it is worth noting that some service providers mentioned that they are highly
interested in the possibility to leverage MaaS technical platform to test and develop their own
app-based products and services. They see it as highly convenient because they can focus on
their core expertise, which is transportation. This view is supported by multiple researchers
who state that the key benefit of a platform is its ability to provide a foundation upon which
complementary products or services can be built while keeping development, transaction and
coordination costs low (Tiwana, 2013). This plug-and-play nature is a unique feature of
platform business which is determined by the degree of modularity of the platform architecture.
Platform literature states that a platform can lower the barriers to entry and increase ease of use
by combining essential tools and functions to encourage platform participation (Parker et al.
2016). Interesting enough, in this study, apart from the API, the interviewees did not mention
explicitly any specific tools or functionalities. This could be interpreted in multiple ways
perhaps the service providers do not consider tools and functionalities critical in their decision-
making. Alternatively, it could be because many of them simply consider MaaS as another
sales channel and thus they
functionalities. Either way, no concrete conclusion can be made based on the empirical findings
and thus, further research is needed to have better understanding.
Ownership of customers, data and brand
Several interviewees mentioned that ownership of customer interactions and data is essential
to operate efficiently, elements that a platform owner can control through platform interface.
roviders provide great services. Indeed,
the CEO of MaaS Global envisioned that transport service providers would be able to leverage
the platform to develop new mobility solutions. Researchers recommend that stable and well
documented interfaces would guarantee a smooth integration, communication and data
exchange between external players and the platform (Tiwana, 2013).
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Some interviewees had the impressions that the rules of the game were not entirely clear. For
instance, they raised questions on how a transport service provider is chosen to receive a
booking, and which criteria are used  is it pricing, location, service quality or a combination
of all three. Some service providers were also concerned that their own brands would be not
recognized once they were part of the platform, and consequently, diminishing their
profitability. It demonstrates that clear agreements on rights, guidelines, tasks division, rules
and procedures among other things are crucial to service providers. Indeed, Boudreau and
Hagiu (2008) confirm that these cooperative boundary resources act as contracts between the
platform owner and external players. They are used to manage the ecosystem, and consequently,
encourage platform participation.
5.4 Facilitating drivers that impact motivations to join a platform
Ryan and Deci (2000) identify four key social and environmental drivers that impact
motivations: expected tangible rewards, sense of autonomy, sense of competence and
relatedness. By analyzing the empirical results, I have found evidence of all these four drivers.
These four drivers are important because they can facilitate or undermine both intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations. They are even more important because most motivation types found in
this study are categorized as extrinsic motivations. Research has suggested that there are
various forms of extrinsic motivations. More internalized motivations, meaning they are more
assimilated to the self and are considered as self-determined, lead to better engagement and
higher performance (Skinner, Wellborn & Connell, 1990). The above mentioned four drivers
can promote such internalization process.
Firstly, service providers join a platform because they expect to gain financial benefits. Several
interviewees believed that the future of transportation was changing, and Mobility-as-a-Service
could be the solution for urban transportation. What I found significant is their willingness to
wait for delayed returns in the future and not require immediate revenue contribution.
Therefore, it is reasonable to claim that the expectation of rewards influences the motivation
of platform participants. Additionally, it is shown that expected rewards include not only
monetary increase but also intangible benefits, such as positive publicity, and digital capability
improvement. This finding is in line with the consensus among researchers who define extrinsic
motivation as doing something because of a separate outcome (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Battistella
& Nonino, 2012).
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Secondly, regarding sense of autonomy, the topic about control were raised in multiple
interviews, especially with service providers that were not part of the platform. The participants
were unease with the idea that someone would make decisions on their prices and would take
over customer interactions. There were also unanswered questions about how the dynamic
between the platform owner and service providers would be once the latter depends on the
former to reach customers. It is not to say that service providers would lose their autonomy
completely when they join a platform. However, it is safe to say that a lack of autonomy, or
even just a doubt whether one would have autonomy, hinder motivation to participate. Indeed,
several studies in classroom environment show that teachers who support autonomy learning
encourage greater motivation, curiosity and higher engagement in their students (Ryan &
Grolnick, 1986). Therefore, it makes sense that a platform ecosystem that grants external
players their autonomy could attract more participation.
Thirdly, many interviewees expressed that their main reason to join a platform is to learn and
to develop their own digital capability. More than one service providers found it beneficial to
leverage the platform to test and innovate new products and services. By collecting data and
sharing it with service providers, the platform provides crucial user feedback which enables
better understanding of the mobility needs of consumers and consequently, service
improvement. Ryan and Deci (2000) share the same opinion, stating that it is human basic
psychological need to feel competent and actions, such as rewards, communication and
feedback, that provide a sense of competence can boost motivation. Though we could not
discuss in depth the functionalities and tools of the platform, I would posit that besides data
sharing, a platform can provide feedback and rewards to its external players through its control
mechanisms.
Lastly, interviewees disclosed that they felt a sense of togetherness and mutual respect when
they enter the partnership with MaaS Global. It was because they could have open dialogues
and communicate to solve emerging problems with the platform owner. Additionally, more
than one interviewee discussed that they shared the same vision about the future of mobility
with the platform owner  to reduce the number of cars and to make the world a better place, a
shared goal that strengthens their partnerships. Researchers call it a sense of relatedness, which,
like autonomy and competence, is a basic human need (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Therefore, feeling
connected to a group, a common goal, or a culture is the groundwork to foster motivation.
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This sub-chapter is significant because it bridges the gap between the what- and the how-
questions of the study objective. In sub-chapters 5.2 and 5.3, we have answered the first
research question on what the motivations to join a MaaS platform are. In this sub-chapter,
from various sources and types of motivations, four specific social and environmental drivers
are narrowed down, those that if being influenced in the right way could nurture motivations.
It means that we are one step closer to answer the second research question on how a platform
owner could attract platform participation. The details are discussed in the next sub-chapter.
5.5 Levers to motivate participants
Analysis of empirical findings shows that there are six levers a platform owner could deploy
to motivate platform participation. Those levers are: 1) Sizable customer base, 2) Fair and
transparent pricing policies, 3) Modular architecture that enables innovation, 4) Clear
agreements on decisions, rules and procedures, 5) Well-documented interfaces that allows
smooth integration and data exchange, and 6) Dedicated resources to support partners.
To promote expected rewards, the platform owner can pull two levers. First is to grow a sizable
customer base which is then strengthened by network effects, and second is to have a fair
earning logic and transparent pricing policies. The interviewees explicitly expected that the
platform would scale across geographic borders in the next few years. This finding is in line
with multiple studies which state that the main reason for app developers to join a platform is
to gain market access (Tiwana, 2013; Van Alstyne et al, 2016). Exponential growth is what
differentiates platform business from traditional one. That is why growth strategy and pricing
are the two most prominent researched topic in platform study. Thus, it is reasonable to state
that by scaling the platform and providing clear pricing policies, a platform owner ensures
service providers the potential financial rewards they could expect once they join the platform,
and thereby, attract platform participation.
Secondly, a sense of autonomy can be fostered through the design of a platform, including both
of its architecture and governance mechanisms. Specifically, a modular architecture would
enable service providers to develop and innovate new offerings while leveraging the technical
foundation of the platform. Multiple interviewees see joining a MaaS platform as an
opportunity to collaborate and innovate app-based services, a capability that their organizations
are current lagging behind. This finding is supported by multiple platform researchers. For
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instance, Gawer (2014) believes that a modular design decreases the interdependency between
the actors in the ecosystem and thus, enables more frequent and faster innovation than any
traditional organizations could. Tiwana (2013) agrees that modularity reduces coordination
costs while allowing external actors autonomy in design and innovation, and therefore, attracts
platform participation.
there is evidence showing that decision rights and control mechanisms contribute
to the degree of autonomy of a platform (Balwin & Clark, 2000). It is evident from the
empirical findings that service providers would like to have authority to make decisions,
especially about pricing, and customer interactions. There is a concern shared by multiple
interviewees that joining a platform would diminish their negotiation power. Some
interviewees also said that it was not entirely clear to them how the rules of the platform work.
Tiwana (2013) suggests that decision right allocation should be in line with the architecture
and it is ideal when both platform owners and external actors could contribute inputs to
complement each other in decision-making. Similarly, through control mechanisms, a platform
owner could enforce the rules of the game  by rewarding desirable behaviors. In any case,
there should be a mutual understanding and agreement between the platform owner and
external players on who makes what decision. Also, a clear guideline on rules and procedures
is necessary. In a nutshell, to be motivated, people need to feel that they make their own
decisions, or stated differently, the needs for autonomy needs to be fulfilled.
Next, regarding a sense of competence, there is limited supporting evidence on what a platform
owner could do. Because the MaaS platform in this study is still in its early stage and several
participants consider it simply as a sales channel, we could not discuss in-depth about the tools
and functionalities of the platform. However, service providers explicitly said that they see
customer data as an essential source of insights, which is needed to operate efficiently and
continuously develop their services. Tiwana (2013) suggest that stable and well-documented
interfaces would support data exchange with external service providers. Additionally, one
could posit that because various control mechanisms are used to reward desirable behaviors
and high performance, they are essentially a form of feedback which could contribute to a sense
of competence of platform participants. This hypothesis should be investigated further before
a conclusion can be confirmed.
Additionally, it is evident that relational control mechanisms and partner support could
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influence a sense of relatedness of platform participants. Tiwana (2013) said that through
relational control, a platform owner sets norms, values and culture to align external players
with the vision and mission of the platform. In this study, some transport service providers are
connected with MaaS Global through a shared vision in which car ridership will be replaced
by smarter and more sustainable mobility solutions in the future. Additionally, partner support,
through dialogues and dedicated resources, helps to strengthen this sense of togetherness
because it demonstrates mutual respect between the platform owner and its external providers.
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, a platform cannot exist and thrive independently from its industry
context. Thus, even though a platform owner cannot directly control or influence industry
trends, they should nevertheless leverage those macro-economic drivers in their growth
strategy. It means, for example, be up-to-date on consumer preferences and any legislation
changes.
5.6 Revised theoretical framework
By the end of chapter 2, a theoretical framework was presented based on a comprehensive
review of relevant literature. Through nine semi-structured interviews, it could be concluded
that the theoretical framework proposed in the beginning is generally supported by the findings.
Both motivational factors and platform design-related factors are presented in the study
empirical evidence. However, some modifications are needed to reflect better the outcome of
this study.
Firstly, this study found mostly extrinsic motivations to join a platform with little evidence of
intrinsic one. The finding is supported by Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006) who claims that while
intrinsic motivations are more important for individual players, extrinsic ones are much more
not relevant in firm-level motivations but in the scope of this study, I revised the theoretical
framework, providing more details on financial gains, reputation, learning and social
contribution, to reflect the findings.
Secondly, all four facilitating drivers  Expected rewards, Sense of autonomy, Sense of
competence and Relatedness  can be found in the study so they remain the same. However,
there is not sufficient evidence to say whether they have positive or negative influence on the
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ore, the arrows now generally indicate that these four drivers
impact motivations to join a platform, without specifying whether it is positive or negative.
Thirdly, there are two new additional levers that a platform could utilize to attract platform
participations: Customer base and Partner support. While these two levers are mentioned in
platform literature, they are not explicitly shown in the initial framework. Since those two
topics occur in multiple interviews, it is reasonable to define them as separate levers to
highlight their important roles.
be confirmed. Specifically, monetary levers, including pricing and customer base, are linked
with expected rewards, which in turn attracts platform participation. Similarly, modular
architecture, fair decision rights and clear control mechanisms contribute to a sense of
autonomy, which is essential for external players to feel motivated. While there is not much
evidence to link platform and a sense of competence, one could argue that standardized
interface that enables data exchange and control mechanisms impact a sense of competence.
The latter is more of a hypothesis and needs further investigations, hence, it is shown as a
dotted line.
with shared vision and partner support.
Lastly, macro-economic drivers are added as the foundation because a platform cannot exist
outside its industry context and thus, their impacts need to be considered when analyzing
platform participation.
Figure 10 below presents the revised theoretical framework.
Expected tangible
rewards
Sense of
autonomy
Sense of
competence
Relatedness
E
Pr
Sizeable
Scalable
Open communication
Fair and transparent
Enable new services development
Easy integration
Enable data exchange
Clear agreements on decision
rights and task division
Clear rules and procedure
Shared vision
Monetary
levers
Non-
monetary
levers
Architecture
Governance
Figure 10. Revised theoretical framework
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6 CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the main findings and their practical implications. Furthermore, I
discuss the limitations of this study which future research should consider and suggest potential
research areas to strengthen the findings.
6.1 Main findings
The objective of this thesis is to understand how a Mobility-as-a-Service ecosystem could
attract service providers to the platform to improve urban transport. Specifically, the study aims
to answer the following research questions:
Research Question 1: What motivates transport service providers to join a MaaS ecosystem?
Research Question 2: How could a MaaS operator attract service providers?
To answer the first question, the findings indicate that platform participation is driven by the
as well as platform design. Regarding participant motivations,
the study found mostly extrinsic motivations, including both monetary and non-monetary ones.
They can be grouped in four main themes. First is financial gains which refer to revenue
increase through wider customer reach. Second, service providers are motivated to join a
platform if it improves their reputation with positive publicity and recognition. Third, service
providers consider joining a platform because of potential learning benefits that comes with
exploring new business models and developing new services. Finally, social contribution is
also one reason to join a platform, when both parties share the same vision and mission to
improve the environment and community. On the other hand, platform design, both platform
architecture and governance mechanisms, plays a critical role to attract service providers.
Essentially, what service providers expect is a smooth and easy integration, clear and fair rules
on pricing, decision rights and procedures, as well as supportive partnerships  all of which are
driven by the platform design.
To answer the second question, this study reveals that there are four facilitating drivers that
 Previously, platform
business and motivations are studied as two separate topics. Through this study, the
connections between the two fields could be confirmed. Specifically, a platform can positively
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influence motivations of potential service providers by targeting the following four areas. First,
expected rewards can be promoted through a sizable customer base and a fair pricing policy.
Second, a sense of autonomy can be ensured with a modular architecture and clear agreements
on decisions rights. Third, a sense of competence can be provided with standardized interface
and potentially control mechanisms. Finally, a sense of relatedness can be fostered with control
mechanisms and partner support. Since the motivations found in the empirical research are
mostly extrinsic, these four drivers are critical to promote the internalization process of
extrinsic motivations, which eventually leads to better engagement and higher productivity.
Besides providing answers for the two research questions, the study also reveals that the current
business model of the case company MaaS Global leans more towards traditional business with
a potential to turn into an open platform ecosystem in the future as shown in the vision of the
founder. This finding confirms the theory which suggests platform business to start as a stand-
alone product or service with a traditional business model before flipping to platform model
(Gawer, 2014; Choudary, 2015)
6.2 Practical findings
This thesis highlights several practical implications that can potentially help platform providers
to attract different groups of service providers to the platform.
In a nutshell, the study confirms that how a platform is designed, in terms of architecture and
governance, play a crucial role to attract platform participation. Specifically, the platform
owner should demonstrate a clear business case with tangible financial gains. Additionally,
pricing and earning logic needs to be transparent and fair and pricing policy should be
attractiveness by providing a smooth technical integration with dedicated partner support as
well as potential toolkits to enable testing and developing new services. Finally, clear
understanding of decision rights, procedures, and data exchange should be established between
the platform owner and external service providers. In other words, the rules of the game should
be transparent and consistent among the participants to minimize complexity, uncertainty and
potential integration and coordination issues.
In addition to platform design, platform providers could tailor their approach to appeal to
different groups of service providers. The findings indicate that service providers join a
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platform for various reasons and their motivations are connected to their firm capabilities.
Therefore, the platform provider is recommended to actively discuss and listen to potential
participants in order to respond to their needs.
Overall, to attract third parties to a platform, the platform provider should provide a compelling
business case with clear financial benefits. It is critical that the platform owner builds a trusting
relationship with its external service providers by putting the benefits of the ecosystem above
its own gains. At the same time, the platform should be open and accessible, with flexible, fair
and transparent governance mechanisms.
6.3 Limitations of the study and suggestion for further research
The findings and its revised theoretical framework bring us one step closer to understand how
to motivate participation in a platform in general, and specifically, in a Mobility-as-a-Service
model. However, there are some limitations that future research should consider in order to
strengthen the findings. Firstly, this thesis focuses on only one case study of MaaS Global with
the aim to build and explore theory purpose. Therefore, further research with multiple cases
and a larger sample, not only within mobility/transportation but also other industries, such as
hospitality, travel, and retail, is necessary to validate the empirical findings and to gain a
comprehensive understanding of the topic.
Secondly, because the case company is at an early stage of a platform business, there is limited
understanding on the functionalities and tools and how they impact platform participation. Part
of the revised theoretical framework remains as a hypothesis and requires confirmation from
further study.
Thirdly, while the study found mostly extrinsic motivations, it could be because the
interviewees responded from a firm-level perspective. Therefore, future study could further
examine how individual motivations could play a role by interviewing key decision-makers of
the companies.
Additionally, in terms of broadening the research scope, while this study focuses specifically
on the service provider side, it would be interesting to understand the perspectives of other
stakeholders as well, for example end-users and policy makers. I find the end-user viewpoint
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particularly interesting becaus
effects and essential its success. Furthermore, extending the research scope to other countries
could yield interesting comparative data to determine whether the factors identified in Finland
would be differ across countries or not. Lastly, besides factors that attract participations, it
would be beneficial to study factors that retain platform participants as well because it impacts
platform success in the long-term.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR IN ENGLISH
INTERVIEW GUIDE
INTRODUCTION
Introduce myself and the purpose of the thesis
Ask permission to record the interview and explain autonomous and confidentiality terms
PROFILE
Could you briefly tell about yourself and your organization?
What are your position and responsibilities in relation to Mobility-as-a-Service?
COMMON QUESTIONS
1. How do you see the future of urban transportation?
2. What do you think about the concept Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS)?
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) is a user-centric, intelligent mobility distribution model in which
supplied to users through a single digital platform. Therefore, MaaS can be viewed as a larger
higher-level platform, that consists of several smaller connected platforms or micro-entities to
form an open innovation ecosystem. Both public and private sector actors can participate to
create innovative mobility solutions (Kamargianni & Matyas, 2017).
One example of a MaaS operator is the Whim app by MaaS Global in Helsinki. MaaS can
extend to added service such as food and groceries delivery to provide a complete service
offering to end- users.
PLATFORM PROVIDER (MAAS GLOBAL)
3. What is the business model of MaaS Global (Whim app)?
4. Who are the current service providers on Whim? Who might be future service providers?
5. What is your vision for future development of MaaS Global?
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PLATFORM CONTRIBUTORS (TRANSPORT SERVICE PROVIDERS)
3. What role does your organization would play within a MaaS ecosystem?
4. What would encourage you/your organization to join a MaaS platform? What would not?
Why?
5. What are the decisive factors to consider when you decide whether or not to join a MaaS
platform? Why?
